Speedy trial under Article 21: can courts set rigid time-limits to end criminal cases? Limits struck down; appeals remanded.

The dominant issue was whether the right to speedy trial under Art. 21 permits SC to prescribe rigid outer time-limits mandating termination of criminal proceedings. SC held that judicially fixing blanket limitation periods akin to Ch. XXXVI CrPC would amount to impermissible judicial legislation and would also conflict with binding precedent; accordingly, previously imposed "bars of limitation" were deleted. A further issue was procedural fairness in State appeals: HC had condoned delay and allowed the appeals without issuing notice to the accused-respondents, violating principles of natural justice; therefore, the impugned HC judgments were set aside and the appeals were remitted for fresh decision after notice. Finalised acquittals/discharges were protected from reopening.

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Issues: Whether the time-limits and bars of limitation laid down by this Court in Common Cause (I & II) and Raj Deo Sharma (I & II) prescribing outer periods after which criminal trials must be mandatorily terminated and accused discharged are constitutionally and legally sustainable, and whether the propositions in A.R. Antulay continue to govern the right to speedy trial under Article 21.

Analysis: The Court examined Article 21 and the constitutional jurisprudence on speedy trial, including A.R. Antulay (Constitution Bench) which adopted a flexible, case-specific balancing test considering factors such as length of delay, justification for delay, assertion of right by accused and prejudice. The Court analysed the directions in Common Cause and Raj Deo Sharma series that prescribed fixed outer time-limits applicable across categories of offences, and assessed whether such judicially-prescribed, mandatory limitation bars amount to permissible judicial directions or impermissible judicial legislation. It considered systemic causes of delay, provisions of the Cr.P.C. (including Sections 258, 309, 311 and inherent powers under Section 482) as alternative mechanisms, and applied the doctrine of precedent that binds benches of lesser strength to Constitution Bench dicta.

Conclusion: The Court held that the dictum in A.R. Antulay is correct and continues to hold the field; fixed, mandatory outer time-limits and bars of limitation as laid down in Common Cause (I & II) and Raj Deo Sharma (I & II) are not good law, amount to impermissible judicial legislation and conflict with A.R. Antulay. Such time-limits may only serve as reminders but do not operate as automatic bars to continuation of trial or proceedings. The appeals were allowed and the impugned High Court orders set aside; the High Courts are directed to hear the appeals afresh after notice to the accused and apply the principles in A.R. Antulay and this judgment.

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