Right to speedy trial under Article 21 led to quashing of long-pending criminal proceedings for oppressive delay.

The right to a speedy trial under Article 21 was applied as part of the fair, just and reasonable procedure required in criminal cases, and delay was assessed by balancing the length of delay, the nature of the offence, the parties' conduct, and any contribution by the accused. The pending trial had remained unresolved for an extremely long period without satisfactory explanation for the period before 2014, charge had not been framed, and no delaying tactics by the applicant were shown. Given the applicant's age and ill health, the delay was found oppressive and unjustified, and the criminal proceedings were quashed insofar as the applicant was concerned.

---

---

Issues: Whether the criminal proceedings were liable to be quashed on the ground that the prolonged pendency of the trial had violated the applicant's right to a speedy trial under Article 21.

Analysis: The application invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to secure quashing of the pending criminal case on the ground of inordinate delay. The Court applied the settled principle that the right to speedy trial is part of the fair, just and reasonable procedure guaranteed by Article 21, and that whether delay amounts to a constitutional violation must be decided on a balancing of relevant factors, including the length of delay, the nature of the offence, the conduct of the parties, and whether the accused contributed to the delay. On the facts, the trial had remained pending for an extremely long period without any satisfactory explanation for the period prior to 2014, charge had not been framed, the applicant was aged and unwell, and no delaying tactics by the applicant were shown. In these circumstances, the delay was held to be oppressive and unjustified.

Conclusion: The proceedings were quashed insofar as the applicant was concerned for violation of the right to speedy trial.

---