Article 142 limits blanket directions on interim stays and fixed disposal timelines, protecting natural justice and High Court autonomy.

Article 142 cannot be used to mandate automatic vacation of interim stays on expiry of time, because such an would nullify lawful interim relief without hearing the affected party and would offend natural justice and substantive rights. Nor can it support a blanket direction that High Courts decide all stayed matters day-to-day within a fixed period, since rigid timelines ignore docket realities and improperly trench on the constitutional autonomy of High Courts. The Court held that Article 142 permits case-specific directions to do complete justice, but not universal procedural rules that override valid judicial orders or the right to be heard.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142, can direct automatic vacation of all interim orders of stay of proceedings passed by High Courts on expiry of a fixed period. (ii) Whether the Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142, can direct High Courts to decide pending cases in which stay has been granted on a day-to-day basis and within a fixed period.

Issue (i): Whether the Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142, can direct automatic vacation of all interim orders of stay of proceedings passed by High Courts on expiry of a fixed period.

Analysis: Interim relief is granted to preserve the efficacy of final relief and ordinarily depends on established considerations such as prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. An order vacating a lawful interim stay cannot be treated as a mechanical consequence of lapse of time alone, especially where the beneficiary of the stay is not responsible for delay. Automatic vacation without hearing the affected party offends natural justice and may defeat substantive rights. Article 142 is a power to do complete justice in the matter before the Court, but it cannot be used to nullify valid judicial orders passed in favour of litigants who are not before the Court or to override substantive rights.

Conclusion: The direction for automatic vacation of interim stays on the mere expiry of time cannot be issued under Article 142 and is impermissible.

Issue (ii): Whether the Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142, can direct High Courts to decide pending cases in which stay has been granted on a day-to-day basis and within a fixed period.

Analysis: Fixing rigid timelines for disposal of pending matters across High Courts amounts to judicial legislation and ignores the differing docket pressures, priorities, and practical constraints of constitutional courts and subordinate courts. While time-bound disposal may be appropriate in exceptional circumstances, a blanket mandate that all stayed matters be heard day-to-day and concluded within a fixed period cannot be imposed as a general rule. The High Courts' constitutional autonomy and power of superintendence, together with the basic structure status of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227, prevent such blanket interference under Article 142. Procedural directions may be issued to streamline case management, but not at the cost of fairness or the right to be heard.

Conclusion: The blanket direction requiring day-to-day disposal within a fixed period cannot be issued under Article 142.

Final Conclusion: The reference is answered against the validity of the automatic-vacation and fixed-timeline directions, and the earlier approach is not approved, subject to the clarification that existing consequences already worked out under that approach are left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Article 142 cannot be used to impose blanket procedural directions that extinguish lawful interim relief or compel universal time-bound disposal in a manner that overrides natural justice, substantive rights, and the constitutional autonomy of High Courts.

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