Limitation Act applies to election appeals where special appellate procedure follows civil procedure and copy-obtaining time is excluded.

Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was treated as applicable to an appeal under section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, because the special appellate limitation was different from the First Schedule and the Limitation Act's computation rules therefore applied. An appeal under section 116-A was also regarded as an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure for article 156, since the High Court exercised the same powers and procedure as in an appeal from an original decree. The time requisite for obtaining a copy of the Tribunal's order could be excluded under section 12, so the limitation objection failed and the election appeal remained maintainable.

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Issues: (i) Whether section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 applied to an appeal under section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 so as to attract the provisions relating to limitation computation. (ii) Whether an appeal under section 116-A was an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the purpose of article 156 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. (iii) Whether the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the Tribunal's order could be excluded under section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 in computing the limitation period for such appeal.

Issue (i): Whether section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 applied to an appeal under section 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 so as to attract the provisions relating to limitation computation.

Analysis: The appeal lay under a special law which prescribed its own limitation period. The expression "different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule" was construed broadly, so that section 29(2) was attracted even if the First Schedule did not contain an identical appeal. The section was also read as a whole, and the second limb was held not to be independent of the conditions stated in the opening words.

Conclusion: Section 29(2) applied, and the appeal was governed by the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act.

Issue (ii): Whether an appeal under section 116-A was an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the purpose of article 156 of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.

Analysis: The expression "appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure" was treated as referring to an appeal governed by the procedure of that Code. Since section 116-A directed the High Court to exercise the same powers, jurisdiction, authority and procedure as in an appeal from an original decree, the appeal fell within that description. The settled construction accepted in prior decisions was not disturbed.

Conclusion: The appeal was an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of article 156.

Issue (iii): Whether the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the Tribunal's order could be excluded under section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 in computing the limitation period for such appeal.

Analysis: An order made under section 98 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 was treated as an appealable order, and where the Tribunal's decision and reasons formed a composite judicial document, section 12 applied. On that footing, the time spent in obtaining the copy was deductible in computing limitation.

Conclusion: The exclusion of time under section 12 was permissible.

Final Conclusion: The limitation objection failed, and the election appeal was maintainable after exclusion of the copy-obtaining period; the appellant's challenge was rejected and the dismissal of the appeal stood.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special law prescribes a limitation period for an appeal and the appellate procedure is assimilated to the Code of Civil Procedure, the Limitation Act applies through section 29(2), including the provisions allowing exclusion of time requisite for obtaining copies of the impugned order.

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