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Issues: (i) Whether an order framing charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act is purely interlocutory so as to bar challenge under the revisional and inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. (ii) Whether Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act bars the High Court from entertaining a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and from granting stay.
Issue (i): Whether an order framing charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act is purely interlocutory so as to bar challenge under the revisional and inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.
Analysis: The statutory scheme of the Prevention of Corruption Act is designed to secure expeditious trials and restrict delay, but the governing principles on interlocutory orders, intermediate orders, and inherent jurisdiction remain relevant. An order framing charge does not finally determine the proceedings, yet it is not a purely interlocutory order in the strict sense because it may be examined in exceptional cases where there is patent illegality, abuse of process, or want of jurisdiction. The earlier line of authority on Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was harmonised with the principle that limited intervention remains available in rare cases.
Conclusion: An order framing charge under the Prevention of Corruption Act is not purely interlocutory, and challenge to such an order is not absolutely barred in appropriate exceptional cases.
Issue (ii): Whether Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act bars the High Court from entertaining a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and from granting stay.
Analysis: Section 19(3)(c) prohibits stay of proceedings on grounds other than sanction-related defects and also restricts revision against interlocutory orders, but it does not abrogate the constitutional status of the High Court or its inherent powers. The High Court's jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India survives, though it must be exercised sparingly, in the rarest of rare cases, and ordinarily only to correct patent jurisdictional error or prevent grave miscarriage of justice. Any stay, if granted, must be by a speaking order and must not frustrate the legislative policy of a speedy trial.
Conclusion: Section 19(3)(c) does not impose an absolute bar on the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, but such power to interfere or stay proceedings is confined to exceptional cases.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to the order framing charge could be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, and the High Court's contrary view on the extent of the bar was set aside to that extent, while reaffirming the primacy of speedy trial in corruption prosecutions.
Ratio Decidendi: A charge-framing order under the Prevention of Corruption Act is not a purely interlocutory order, and the statutory bar against stay or revision does not extinguish the High Court's constitutional and inherent jurisdiction, though that jurisdiction must be exercised only in rare cases of patent illegality, abuse of process, or lack of jurisdiction.