Interlocutory order in criminal revision narrowly construed; summoning order affecting accused's rights remained revisable.

The expression "interlocutory order" under Section 397(2) CrPC was given a restricted meaning, covering only purely interim orders that do not affect substantial rights. An order summoning accused persons after acceptance of the police report and dismissal of the complaint was held not to be interlocutory because it materially affected their rights and compelled them to face trial; it was therefore revisable. Section 482 CrPC cannot be used to bypass an express statutory bar under Section 397(2), but that limitation did not apply here because the impugned summoning order was not interlocutory. The revision was accordingly competent and the matter was remitted for consideration on merits.

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Issues: (i) Whether an order summoning the accused after acceptance of the police report and dismissal of the complaint was an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (ii) Whether the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could be used where revision was said to be barred by Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (i): Whether an order summoning the accused after acceptance of the police report and dismissal of the complaint was an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The expression "interlocutory order" was held to have a restricted meaning in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It covers only orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or affect the important rights or liabilities of the parties. Orders which are matters of moment, or which substantially affect the rights of the accused, are not interlocutory orders. On the facts, the appellants had earlier been released on the police report, the complaint against them had been dismissed, and the impugned order straightaway summoned them for trial. That order took away a valuable right and compelled them to face trial without proper application of mind.

Conclusion: The summoning order was not an interlocutory order and was therefore open to revision.

Issue (ii): Whether the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could be used where revision was said to be barred by Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The inherent power preserved by Section 482 does not create new power and cannot be exercised to defeat an express statutory bar. Where Section 397(2) clearly excludes revision against a particular interlocutory order, Section 482 cannot be invoked to bypass that prohibition. Since the impugned summoning order was found not to be interlocutory, the bar did not apply on the facts.

Conclusion: Section 482 could not be used to circumvent Section 397(2), but the revision was competent because the impugned order was not interlocutory.

Final Conclusion: The order summoning the appellants was held to be a revisable order affecting their rights, and the matter was sent back for consideration of the revision on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: In criminal revision, "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 means only a purely interim order that does not affect substantial rights of the parties; an order which materially affects the accused's right to be tried is not barred from revision, and inherent powers cannot be used to override an express statutory prohibition.

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