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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court was barred from entertaining a revision after the Sessions Judge had already exercised revisional jurisdiction under Section 397(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (ii) Whether the High Court could still interfere under its inherent and supervisory powers to prevent miscarriage of justice.
Issue (i): Whether the High Court was barred from entertaining a revision after the Sessions Judge had already exercised revisional jurisdiction under Section 397(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: Section 397(3) bars a second revision by the same person, and the provision is meant to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and delay. The bar, however, operates within the revisional framework under Section 397 and does not extinguish the High Court's wider powers under Sections 401 and 482, or its supervisory role under Section 483. The Court also indicated that the State is not within the ordinary mischief of the expression "person" for the purpose of the prohibition in the same manner as a private litigant.
Conclusion: The High Court was not rendered wholly powerless by Section 397(3), and the prohibition did not by itself prevent intervention in an appropriate case.
Issue (ii): Whether the High Court could still interfere under its inherent and supervisory powers to prevent miscarriage of justice.
Analysis: The Court held that the inherent power preserved by Section 482 remains available notwithstanding the revision bar, and that the High Court's continuous superintendence under Section 483 enables correction of grave illegality, abuse of process, irregularity, or failure of justice. Applying the principles laid down in the earlier authorities, the Court distinguished cases where the High Court had impermissibly re-opened matters from cases where intervention was justified to secure the ends of justice. On the facts, the High Court's interference was treated as justified because it sought to correct an order leading to miscarriage of justice and remitted the matter for decision on merits.
Conclusion: The High Court could validly interfere under Sections 482 and 483, and its order setting aside the discharge was upheld.
Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the impugned interference was within the High Court's residual powers and was not vitiated by lack of jurisdiction.
Ratio Decidendi: The bar on a second revision under Section 397(3) does not exclude the High Court's inherent power under Section 482 or its supervisory power under Section 483, and those powers may be exercised sparingly to prevent miscarriage of justice or abuse of process.