Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: (i) Whether the petitioners could invoke the inherent jurisdiction again after having already pursued revision against the same order in view of the bar under section 397(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. (ii) Whether the complaint and the orders of the courts below warranted quashing under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, want of locus standi, or absence of any prima facie offence under the Companies Act, 1956.
Issue (i): Whether the petitioners could invoke the inherent jurisdiction again after having already pursued revision against the same order in view of the bar under section 397(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
Analysis: The earlier revisional remedy had already been exhausted against the trial court's order. The inherent power under section 482 is preserved to prevent abuse of process and to secure the ends of justice, but it cannot be used to defeat the statutory bar on a second revision merely by changing the label of the proceeding. That power is available only in exceptional cases where there is grave miscarriage of justice, abuse of process, failure of justice, or non-compliance with statutory procedure.
Conclusion: The petitioners could not use section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 to circumvent the bar created by section 397(3) in the absence of exceptional circumstances.
Issue (ii): Whether the complaint and the orders of the courts below warranted quashing under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, want of locus standi, or absence of any prima facie offence under the Companies Act, 1956.
Analysis: The complaint disclosed allegations that the prospectus conditions relating to debentures were not honoured and that the conduct complained of attracted the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The courts below had considered the objections in detail and found that the matter disclosed a prima facie case for trial. The contention that the complainant lacked standing was also repelled, as the matter could not be quashed at the threshold merely on that ground. No material was found to show grave injustice, abuse of process, or a jurisdictional defect calling for interference at the inherent stage.
Conclusion: The complaint was not liable to be quashed and the orders of the courts below were sustained.
Final Conclusion: The inherent jurisdiction was declined, and the complaint was permitted to proceed to trial without interference from the High Court.