Specific averment required for director liability in cheque-dishonour cases; prior revision does not bar inherent jurisdiction.

Vicarious liability of a company director in a cheque-dishonour prosecution arises only when the complaint specifically pleads that, at the relevant time, the director was in charge of and responsible for the company's business; mere designation as a director or reference to board resolutions is insufficient. On the facts, the complaint lacked the necessary averment, so proceedings against the appellant could not be sustained. The High Court's inherent power under Section 482 CrPC was not barred merely because revision had earlier been pursued on similar grounds; prior use of revisional jurisdiction did not prevent examination of the summoning order on merits. The summoning order and connected proceedings against the appellant were quashed.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether the complaint and accompanying material contained the requisite specific averment that the director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business so as to attract vicarious liability under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; (ii) Whether the High Court could refuse relief under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 merely because a revision under Section 397 of that Code had earlier been pursued on similar grounds.

Issue (i): Whether the complaint and accompanying material contained the requisite specific averment that the director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business so as to attract vicarious liability under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: Liability of a director in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arises only when the complaint specifically pleads that, at the relevant time, the person was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business. Mere status as a director is insufficient. The material relied upon against the appellant was only her signature on board resolutions, which did not establish day-to-day control of the business. The complaint also lacked any direct allegation satisfying the basic requirement for fastening liability under Section 141 of the Act.

Conclusion: The requisite averment was absent, and the prosecution against the appellant could not be sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court could refuse relief under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 merely because a revision under Section 397 of that Code had earlier been pursued on similar grounds.

Analysis: The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not ousted merely because a revision remedy was earlier invoked. The availability or prior use of revisional jurisdiction does not by itself bar exercise of inherent powers where interference is necessary to prevent miscarriage of justice or abuse of process. The earlier invocation of revision therefore did not preclude examination of the challenge to the summoning order on merits.

Conclusion: The High Court's view that the petition under Section 482 was barred on this ground was incorrect.

Final Conclusion: The summoning order and the connected proceedings against the appellant were quashed, while the prosecution of the co-accused was left unaffected.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution for cheque dishonour against a company director, vicarious liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 requires a specific averment that the director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business at the relevant time, and the High Court's inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 remains available despite an earlier revision on the same subject.

---