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Issues: (i) Whether the bar under section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 excludes revision against every order that is not a final order, including an order framing process or rejecting a challenge to jurisdiction; (ii) Whether the inherent power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 remains available where revision is barred under section 397(2).
Issue (i): Whether the bar under section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 excludes revision against every order that is not a final order, including an order framing process or rejecting a challenge to jurisdiction.
Analysis: The expression "interlocutory order" cannot be read in its widest sense as the mere opposite of a final order. A purely literal approach would make the revisional jurisdiction under section 397(1) largely nugatory and would not fit the scheme of the Code. Orders which are not final in the strict sense, yet decide an important or vital issue and are not purely procedural, may fall in a middle category and are not necessarily hit by section 397(2). An order which, if accepted, would terminate the proceeding in that court is not to be treated as a purely interlocutory order for the purpose of the revisional bar.
Conclusion: The bar under section 397(2) does not extend to every non-final order, and the impugned order was not barred from revision on that ground.
Issue (ii): Whether the inherent power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 remains available where revision is barred under section 397(2).
Analysis: Section 482 preserves the High Court's inherent power to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice. That power is not to be used routinely where specific remedies exist, but it is not destroyed by the revisional bar in section 397(2). Where a proceeding is initiated without jurisdiction, is vexatious, or is otherwise an abuse of process, the High Court may intervene even if revision is unavailable. The existence of section 397(2) therefore does not exclude section 482 in appropriate cases.
Conclusion: The inherent power under section 482 survives the revisional bar and may be invoked in suitable cases.
Final Conclusion: The High Court's refusal to entertain the revision on the ground of maintainability was unsustainable, and the matter was sent back for disposal on merits in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: The term "interlocutory order" in section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not cover every order that is not final; intermediate orders affecting important rights may be revisable, and the inherent power under section 482 remains available to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice notwithstanding the revisional bar.
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