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Issues: (i) Whether criminal proceedings could be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 after dismissal of the discharge application and the revision petition on the same factual grounds. (ii) Whether the alleged invalidity and delay in granting sanction to prosecute furnished a ground to quash the proceedings at the threshold.
Issue (i): Whether criminal proceedings could be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 after dismissal of the discharge application and the revision petition on the same factual grounds.
Analysis: The material had already been examined by the Special Court at the discharge stage and by the High Court in revision, and both had found a prima facie case for trial. The later petition under Section 482 raised substantially the same grounds without any material change in facts. The permissible scope of inherent jurisdiction does not extend to reappreciating evidence, assessing whether conviction is likely, or conducting a mini trial when the matter is only at the stage of proceeding against the accused.
Conclusion: The quashing of the prosecution on this ground was unjustified and the proceedings ought not to have been interdicted under Section 482.
Issue (ii): Whether the alleged invalidity and delay in granting sanction to prosecute furnished a ground to quash the proceedings at the threshold.
Analysis: The validity of a sanction order, including questions of competence, application of mind, delay, or alleged irregularity, is ordinarily a matter for examination during trial when the relevant file and evidence can be tested. A mere delay in the grant of sanction does not, by itself, warrant quashing of the prosecution, particularly where the alleged discrepancy could be explained by evidence at trial.
Conclusion: The sanction-related objections did not justify quashing the criminal proceedings at the threshold.
Final Conclusion: The order quashing the prosecution was set aside and the criminal case was restored to the trial court for continuation of trial from the stage at which it was interrupted.
Ratio Decidendi: The inherent power to quash cannot be used to revisit the merits of a prosecution already found to disclose a prima facie case, and objections to the validity or delay of sanction for prosecution ordinarily remain matters for determination at trial rather than at the quashing stage.