Presumption for cheque dishonour stands where execution is admitted; mere denial cannot displace liability in revision.

Once execution of the cheque was admitted, presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act arose that the cheque was issued for a legally enforceable liability. The drawer had to rebut that presumption with a probable defence supported by cogent material; mere denial or an unsupported plea of misuse of a blank cheque was insufficient. The cheque, signature, dishonour, statutory notice, and non-payment were proved, and the presumption remained unrebutted. In revision, interference was also limited because the HC would not reappreciate evidence as a second appellate court unless a glaring illegality or miscarriage of justice was shown. Conviction and sentence were upheld.

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Issues: Whether the conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 called for interference in revision in view of the admitted cheque and signature, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, and the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The cheque, its signature, dishonour, statutory notice, and non-payment were found to be proved. Once execution of the cheque was admitted, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 arose that the cheque had been issued towards a legally enforceable liability. The burden then shifted to the drawer to rebut that presumption by a probable defence, either through defence evidence or materials brought by the complainant. Mere denial, or the plea that a blank cheque had been misused, was insufficient without cogent proof. The Court also held that in revision it could not reappreciate evidence as a second appellate court and would interfere only where a glaring illegality or miscarriage of justice was shown.

Conclusion: The presumption in favour of the complainant was not rebutted and no revisional interference was warranted; the conviction and sentence were upheld against the petitioner.

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