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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could entertain a second revision by invoking inherent powers under Section 482 after dismissal of a revision under Section 397(3) of the Code; (ii) Whether the Magistrate was competent to withdraw an attachment under Section 146 when the civil court had already passed an interim injunction.
Issue (i): Whether the High Court could entertain a second revision by invoking inherent powers under Section 482 after dismissal of a revision under Section 397(3) of the Code.
Analysis: Section 397(3) expressly bars a second revision by the same party. The inherent power under Section 482 cannot be used to do what the Code specifically prohibits. Once the respondent had already pursued and lost a revision before the Sessions Judge, the High Court could not entertain a second revision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The High Court was not competent to entertain the second revision under Section 482, and this issue was decided in favour of the appellants.
Issue (ii): Whether the Magistrate was competent to withdraw an attachment under Section 146 when the civil court had already passed an interim injunction.
Analysis: Section 146 permits attachment only until a competent court determines rights, and the determination need not await final adjudication. An interim injunction or appointment of a receiver by the civil court is sufficient to displace the attachment, because the civil court then becomes seized of the dispute and the likelihood of breach of peace may cease. The proviso to Section 146 also permits withdrawal of attachment when that likelihood no longer exists. The continued attachment despite the civil court's interlocutory order was therefore inconsistent with the scheme of the provision.
Conclusion: The Magistrate lawfully withdrew the attachment, and the High Court erred in holding otherwise.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the High Court's order was set aside, and the Magistrate's withdrawal of attachment was upheld.
Ratio Decidendi: The inherent powers under Section 482 cannot be invoked to circumvent the statutory bar on second revision, and an attachment under Section 146 of the Code must yield once the civil court seizes the dispute through an effective interlocutory order such as an injunction or receiver order.