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Issues: Whether the High Court could invoke its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to interfere with an order of discharge after a revision against that order had already been filed and decided under section 397(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, and whether the criminal proceedings arising out of the paddy/rice supply dispute disclosed a case warranting interference.
Analysis: The statutory bar against a second revision under section 397(3) does not by itself extinguish the High Court's inherent powers, but those powers are to be used sparingly and only to prevent abuse of process, secure the ends of justice, or correct a serious miscarriage of justice. The discharge had been upheld by the revisional court on a detailed consideration of the facts, and the dispute was treated by the courts below as essentially civil in nature. The record also showed that arbitration proceedings had been initiated and that similar facts had earlier been held not to make out an offence under section 406 IPC. In these circumstances, there was no exceptional ground justifying interference under section 482.
Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in exercising inherent power under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the facts of the case, and the order of discharge in favour of the appellant stood affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi: Inherent powers under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code may be exercised despite the bar on a second revision, but only in exceptional cases of abuse of process or serious miscarriage of justice; they cannot be used as a substitute for a prohibited revision.