Inherent jurisdiction cannot bypass second revision bar, and cheque dishonour complaints stay where liability is disputed.

A petition under Section 482 CrPC was held not maintainable where the petitioners had already pursued revision, because inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to bypass the statutory bar on a second revision except in exceptional cases. The Court also declined to quash Section 138 NI Act complaints at the threshold: the cheques had been dishonoured and demand notices issued, while the defence based on alleged absence of liability, tenancy adjustment, and security deposit refund raised disputed factual and civil issues requiring evidence. Those disputes could not negate the prima facie ingredients of the offence or justify interference at the quashing stage.

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Issues: (i) Whether a petition under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court could be entertained after the petitioners had already availed the revisional remedy, in view of the bar against a second revisional challenge; (ii) Whether the criminal complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were liable to be interdicted on the plea that no legally enforceable liability subsisted and that the prosecution was an abuse of process.

Issue (i): Whether a petition under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court could be entertained after the petitioners had already availed the revisional remedy, in view of the bar against a second revisional challenge.

Analysis: The petitioners had already challenged the Magistrate's order before the Sessions Court in revision. The bar against a second revisional challenge under Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was relevant, and the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could be invoked only in a special case. On the facts, no such exceptional ground was made out.

Conclusion: The petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not maintainable as a substitute for a second revision.

Issue (ii): Whether the criminal complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were liable to be interdictd on the plea that no legally enforceable liability subsisted and that the prosecution was an abuse of process.

Analysis: The dishonoured cheques had already been presented, returned unpaid, and followed by statutory demand notices before the tenancy ended. The later return of possession and the existence of a security deposit raised disputed civil questions, including adjustment and refund, which were not shown to have been raised in response to the demand notices. Such questions could not, at the threshold, negate the prima facie ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The defence turned on facts requiring evidence and was not a ground for quashing at this stage.

Conclusion: The criminal complaints were not liable to be quashed and no case for interference was made out.

Final Conclusion: The petitions failed and the criminal proceedings were left to continue before the trial court.

Ratio Decidendi: Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be used to bypass the statutory bar on a second revision, and proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 will not be quashed at the threshold where the defence depends on disputed facts and civil claims requiring trial.

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