Inherent criminal jurisdiction cannot act as a second revision; cheque dishonour notice and summoning were upheld.

Section 482 CrPC cannot be used as a substitute for a second revision after the bar in Section 397(3), and inherent power is reserved for exceptional cases of abuse of process or manifest miscarriage of justice; where the defence needs evidence, the matter must go to trial. In a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a legal notice is to be read as a whole, and if it conveys the cheque particulars and demand on dishonour, no quashing is warranted merely for alleged ambiguity. The challenge to the notice and summoning order therefore failed, and the accused were left to raise their defence before the trial court.

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Issues: (i) Whether the petitioners could invoke inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 after having already pursued a revision, despite the bar against a second revision under Section 397(3) of that Code; (ii) Whether the legal notice and the summoning proceedings in the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 disclosed any infirmity warranting quashing.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioners could invoke inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 after having already pursued a revision, despite the bar against a second revision under Section 397(3) of that Code.

Analysis: The bar under Section 397(3) of the Code prevents a litigant from using Section 482 as a substitute for a second revision. The inherent power is available only sparingly, and only where there is serious miscarriage of justice, abuse of process, or an apparent mistake requiring correction. On the facts, no such exceptional circumstance was shown, and the defence raised required evidence that could not be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 482.

Conclusion: The petitioners were not entitled to invoke Section 482 as a second revisional remedy, and the challenge on this ground failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the legal notice and the summoning proceedings in the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 disclosed any infirmity warranting quashing.

Analysis: The notice was required to be read as a whole, and its contents disclosed the cheque details and the demand arising from dishonour. The Court found no ambiguity or vagueness of such a nature as to defeat the complaint. It also reiterated that offences under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act operate within a special procedural framework, and that defences concerning liability or trial procedure are to be raised before the trial court in the manner contemplated by the statute and the Code.

Conclusion: No defect was found in the notice or the summoning proceedings sufficient to justify quashing.

Final Conclusion: The inherent jurisdiction was declined because the case did not disclose any exceptional ground for interference, and the petitioners were left to pursue their defence before the trial court in accordance with law.

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