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Issues: Whether the High Court, in second appeal, could interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support those findings.
Analysis: The governing principle is that under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court in second appeal cannot reappreciate evidence merely because it considers the evidence insufficient or inadequate to sustain the findings of fact. Once the evidence relied upon by the courts of fact is admissible and relevant, its sufficiency is a matter for the fact-finding courts and not a question open in second appeal. Interference is permissible only within the narrow limits of Section 100, and not to upset concurrent factual conclusions on a reassessment of the evidence. The High Court had therefore exceeded its jurisdiction in reversing the concurrent findings on title and possession.
Conclusion: The High Court's interference with the concurrent findings of fact was unlawful, and the appeal was allowed in favour of the appellants.
Ratio Decidendi: In a second appeal, concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed on the ground that the evidence is insufficient or inadequately persuasive if the evidence is admissible and relevant; such sufficiency is exclusively for the courts of fact.