Second appeal limits and reasonable-time enforcement in specific performance of immovable property contracts

Section 100 CPC permits a second appeal only on a precisely formulated substantial question of law, so concurrent findings of fact on readiness and willingness, abandonment, and the nature of the contract cannot be reopened by reappreciating evidence. The High Court therefore could not interfere merely because another factual inference was possible. In specific performance of an immovable property contract, time is ordinarily not of the essence, but the promisee must still act within a reasonable time having regard to the contract terms and surrounding circumstances. On the evidence, repeated demands, notice after the agreed date, and prompt suit showed reasonable diligence, entitling the plaintiff to specific performance.

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Issues: (i) whether the High Court could interfere in second appeal with concurrent findings of fact by treating the question framed as a substantial question of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; (ii) whether the suit for specific performance had been brought and prosecuted within a reasonable time when time was not the essence of the contract.

Issue (i): whether the High Court could interfere in second appeal with concurrent findings of fact by treating the question framed as a substantial question of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: Section 100, as amended, permits a second appeal only on a substantial question of law precisely formulated by the High Court. A mere reappreciation of evidence or substitution of a different view on facts does not amount to a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings on readiness and willingness, abandonment, and the nature of the contract could not be disturbed merely because another inference was possible on the same evidence.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in reopening the concurrent findings of fact, and the so-called substantial question of law was not a real substantial question of law.

Issue (ii): whether the suit for specific performance had been brought and prosecuted within a reasonable time when time was not the essence of the contract.

Analysis: In contracts for sale of immovable property, time is ordinarily not of the essence, but the promisee must still seek enforcement within a reasonable time judged by the terms of the contract, the nature of the property, and the surrounding circumstances. The agreement fixed a date for completion, the plaintiff made repeated demands, issued notice after the agreed date, and instituted the suit soon thereafter. The finding of the courts below that the plaintiff acted without delay was supported by the evidence.

Conclusion: The plaintiff acted within a reasonable time and remained entitled to specific performance.

Final Conclusion: The impugned judgment was set aside and the decree for specific performance passed by the courts below was restored, leaving the plaintiff successful on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: In second appeal, concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed unless the case involves a genuine substantial question of law, and where time is not the essence of an immovable property contract, readiness and willingness must be assessed on the facts to determine whether enforcement was sought within a reasonable time.

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