Cheque liability and second appeal limits: presumption of debt stands unless rebutted on probabilities, with no interference absent legal error.

In second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court will interfere only if a substantial question of law arises, and it will not reappreciate evidence absent perversity. The Court applied the Section 139 NI Act presumption that a cheque is issued towards a legally enforceable debt, which remains rebuttable on a preponderance of probabilities. It also held that non-disclosure of the underlying loan transaction in income tax returns does not by itself make the debt legally unrecoverable. On the factual record, the defence failed to rebut the presumption, and the first appellate court's findings were upheld; no substantial question of law arose and the decree remained undisturbed.

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Issues: Whether the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 disclosed any substantial question of law warranting interference with the first appellate decree.

Analysis: The Court reiterated that in second appeal the High Court can interfere only where a substantial question of law arises, and not for a mere reappreciation of evidence. The appellant's challenge to the decree was founded on the contention that the cheque-based liability was not legally enforceable because the alleged loan was not reflected in income tax returns and because the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was said to be insufficient. The Court held that the earlier view relied upon by the appellant had lost force in light of later Supreme Court authority, which clarified that Section 139 includes a presumption of legally enforceable debt and that the accused may rebut it only on a preponderance of probabilities. It was also held that non-disclosure of a transaction in income tax returns does not by itself make the debt unrecoverable. On the factual record, the Court found that the defence evidence did not rebut the presumption, and the first appellate court's appreciation of evidence was neither perverse nor unsupported by material.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose, and the challenge to the decree failed.

Final Conclusion: The second appeal was not maintainable on the facts and law as argued and the decree in favour of the respondent remained undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: In a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the High Court will not interfere with concurrent or first appellate findings of fact unless a substantial question of law arises, and a cheque presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 remains rebuttable only on a preponderance of probabilities; mere non-disclosure of the underlying transaction in income tax returns does not, by itself, destroy legal enforceability of the debt.

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