Second appeal jurisdiction narrowed to substantial questions of law; inconsistent Punjab procedural provision cannot override amended CPC requirements.

The amended Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 confines second appeals to cases involving a substantial question of law and requires that question to be formulated. Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 was held repugnant to that amended scheme and could not continue to govern second appeals to the extent it dispensed with that requirement. The Court also clarified that findings of fact are ordinarily not reopened in second appeal, though perversity or other legal error may give rise to a substantial question of law. High Court interference must therefore comply with Section 100, and not rest on Section 41 alone.

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Issues: (i) whether Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 survived the amendment of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and could continue to govern second appeals without the requirement of a substantial question of law; (ii) whether the High Court could interfere with findings of fact in second appeal in the absence of a properly framed substantial question of law, including on the ground of perversity.

Issue (i): whether Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 survived the amendment of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and could continue to govern second appeals without the requirement of a substantial question of law.

Analysis: The amended Section 100 of the Code restricted second appeals to cases involving a substantial question of law and required formulation of that question. Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act was in pari materia with the unamended provision, but after the 1976 amendment it became inconsistent with the new statutory scheme. The saving language in Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the general saving effect of Section 100 could not prevail against Section 97(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, which repealed inconsistent State provisions. In view of Article 254 of the Constitution of India and the doctrine of repugnancy, the later Parliamentary law prevailed.

Conclusion: Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 was repugnant to the amended Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and could not continue to operate to the extent of the inconsistency.

Issue (ii): whether the High Court could interfere with findings of fact in second appeal in the absence of a properly framed substantial question of law, including on the ground of perversity.

Analysis: While findings of fact are ordinarily not disturbed in second appeal, a finding vitiated by wrong test, assumptions, conjectures, or perversity may raise a substantial question of law. Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 also permits determination of issues necessary for disposal where the evidence on record is sufficient. The High Court, however, must expressly indicate compliance with Section 100 by identifying the substantial question of law and, where relevant, the element of perversity.

Conclusion: The High Court could not proceed under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 alone, and its interference had to satisfy the requirements of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded, the High Court's judgment in second appeal was set aside, and the decree of the lower appellate court was restored.

Ratio Decidendi: After the 1976 amendment, an inconsistent State procedural law governing second appeals stands overridden by Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 read with Section 97(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, and the High Court's second appellate jurisdiction exists only where a substantial question of law is identified and dealt with accordingly.

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