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Issues: Whether the High Court could interfere in second appeal with the first appellate court's findings of fact in the absence of a substantial question of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Analysis: Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure restricts a second appeal to cases involving a substantial question of law, which must be stated in the memorandum of appeal and formulated by the High Court at admission. The jurisdiction does not extend to reappreciation of evidence or disturbance of concurrent or first appellate findings of fact merely because another view is possible. A question already settled by binding authority, or a mere challenge to appreciation of evidence, does not become substantial. Interference is justified only where the findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to mandatory legal provisions, or where jurisdiction has been assumed without authority. On the facts, the first appellate court had reached its conclusion on the basis of evidence and the High Court had merely reassessed that evidence.
Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in interfering in second appeal, as no substantial question of law arose; the interference with the first appellate court's findings was impermissible.
Ratio Decidendi: In a second appeal, the High Court cannot reappreciate evidence or upset factual findings unless a substantial question of law arises within the strict confines of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.