SARFAESI civil suit bar: a bare fraud plea cannot confer jurisdiction or defeat rejection of the plaint.

Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act bars civil court jurisdiction where the dispute concerns measures taken under Section 13(4) and the remedy lies before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, so a plaint directly challenging such measures is liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d). A mere assertion of fraud does not bypass that bar unless fraud is pleaded with specific particulars under Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC; a bald plea is insufficient. In second appeal, no substantial question of law arose under Section 100 CPC because the findings rested on the statutory bar and the inadequacy of the fraud plea.

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Issues: (i) Whether the suit challenging measures taken under the SARFAESI Act was barred by Section 34 and the plaint was liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (ii) Whether a bare plea of fraud was sufficient to avoid the statutory bar and confer civil court jurisdiction. (iii) Whether any substantial question of law arose in the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (i): Whether the suit challenging measures taken under the SARFAESI Act was barred by Section 34 and the plaint was liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act bars civil court jurisdiction in respect of matters that the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine, and also prohibits injunctions against actions taken under the Act. The relief sought in the suit directly assailed measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4), a subject squarely within the statutory remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. In such circumstances, the plaint disclosed a bar of law on its face and was liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d).

Conclusion: The issue is answered against the appellant and in favour of the respondents.

Issue (ii): Whether a bare plea of fraud was sufficient to avoid the statutory bar and confer civil court jurisdiction.

Analysis: The exception relating to fraud applies only where fraud is pleaded with necessary particulars and is not satisfied by a mere incantation of the word. The pleading in the present case did not contain specific particulars of fraud as required by Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Since the allegation remained a bald assertion, it could not override the express bar created by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.

Conclusion: The issue is answered against the appellant and in favour of the respondents.

Issue (iii): Whether any substantial question of law arose in the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The jurisdiction under Section 100 is confined to cases involving a substantial question of law. The concurrent findings of the courts below were based on the statutory bar under the SARFAESI Act and the insufficiency of the fraud plea. No debatable or material question of law arose for determination in second appeal.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose, and the second appeal could not succeed.

Final Conclusion: The statutory remedy under the SARFAESI framework was held to be exclusive on the facts pleaded, and the civil suit was not maintainable on the basis of an unsupported allegation of fraud.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the plaint itself discloses a challenge to SARFAESI measures within the domain of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, and fraud is not pleaded with specific particulars, civil court jurisdiction is barred and the plaint is liable to rejection.

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