Section 100 CPC limits second appeals to substantial questions of law; concurrent findings and unsupported remand cannot be disturbed.

In second appeal, Section 100 CPC confines interference to substantial questions of law arising from the pleadings and the record, so concurrent findings of fact are not to be disturbed unless they are perverse or contrary to law. The High Court's framed questions were treated as factual, making interference with the trial and first appellate courts unjustified. Remand for a de novo trial under Order XLI Rules 23, 23-A and 25 CPC requires a legal basis and recorded reasons; absent these, the appellate court must decide the appeal on merits, so the remand could not stand. On merits, adverse possession against the State was not proved, while the landlord-tenant relationship was established.

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Issues: (i) Whether the second appeal involved any substantial question of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and whether the High Court could interfere with concurrent findings of fact; (ii) Whether the High Court was justified in remanding the suits for de novo trial without a proper basis or a framed substantial question of law on remand; (iii) Whether the respondents had proved title to the suit land on the basis of adverse possession and whether the appellants had established the relationship of landlord and tenant.

Issue (i): Whether the second appeal involved any substantial question of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and whether the High Court could interfere with concurrent findings of fact.

Analysis: Section 100 restricts the jurisdiction in second appeal to substantial questions of law that are debatable, material to the decision, and arise from the pleadings and sustainable findings of fact. Concurrent findings recorded by the trial court and the first appellate court are not to be disturbed unless they are perverse or contrary to law. The questions framed by the High Court were essentially factual and did not satisfy the statutory test.

Conclusion: The second appeals did not involve a substantial question of law, and interference with the concurrent findings was unjustified.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court was justified in remanding the suits for de novo trial without a proper basis or a framed substantial question of law on remand.

Analysis: Remand under Order XLI Rules 23, 23-A, and 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 requires a legal foundation and recorded reasons showing why the case falls within the relevant rule. No such ground had been raised or established, and no substantial question of law on remand had been framed. The appellate court was therefore bound to decide the appeals on merits rather than order a fresh trial.

Conclusion: The remand order was without jurisdiction and could not stand.

Issue (iii): Whether the respondents had proved title to the suit land on the basis of adverse possession and whether the appellants had established the relationship of landlord and tenant.

Analysis: The respondents' claim to title depended entirely on adverse possession against the State, and the burden lay on them to prove continuous, hostile possession with satisfactory evidence. Both courts below found that they failed to establish such possession. The concurrent finding that the appellants had established the landlord-tenant relationship was supported by the evidence and was not shown to be perverse. The question relating to an alleged family gift deed was unrelated to the real controversy.

Conclusion: The respondents failed to prove title by adverse possession, and the appellants succeeded in proving the landlord-tenant relationship.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's judgment was unsustainable, the remand was set aside, and the decrees of the trial court and first appellate court were restored in favour of the appellants.

Ratio Decidendi: In second appeal, interference is confined to substantial questions of law arising from the pleadings and concurrent findings of fact cannot be displaced or remanded for a fresh trial unless the statutory conditions for such interference are satisfied.

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