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Issues: (i) Whether an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was maintainable after the suit had been decreed and the alleged breach related to an undertaking that had become part of the decree, and whether the proper remedy lay in execution under Order XXI Rule 32; (ii) Whether the alleged breach of undertaking and the inconsistent pleas taken in the subsequent proceedings justified initiation and punishment for criminal contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Issue (i): Whether an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was maintainable after the suit had been decreed and the alleged breach related to an undertaking that had become part of the decree, and whether the proper remedy lay in execution under Order XXI Rule 32.
Analysis: Order XXXIX Rule 2A operates only in relation to disobedience of an interim injunction during the pendency of a suit. Once a suit is decreed, any interim arrangement merges in the final decree. If the grievance is breach of the decree or of an undertaking embodied in the decree, the proper course is execution under Order XXI Rule 32, which provides the prescribed mode for enforcing injunction decrees. The contempt jurisdiction cannot be used as a substitute for execution where an effective statutory remedy exists.
Conclusion: The application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was not maintainable, and the remedy lay in execution proceedings.
Issue (ii): Whether the alleged breach of undertaking and the inconsistent pleas taken in the subsequent proceedings justified initiation and punishment for criminal contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Analysis: Wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court may amount to civil contempt, but criminal contempt requires a clear case of obstruction of administration of justice affecting public interest. On the facts, the dispute concerned private rights arising out of a civil decree. The proceedings were summary and procedurally unsustainable, and the foundation for the contempt reference itself was lacking. In such circumstances, the matter could not be elevated into criminal contempt merely because inconsistent standpoints were taken in the collateral proceedings.
Conclusion: The case did not warrant criminal contempt proceedings, and the conviction could not stand.
Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence for contempt were set aside because the contempt route was unavailable on these facts and the dispute had to be worked out through execution of the civil decree.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a civil decree embodies the undertaking or injunction complained of, enforcement must ordinarily be sought through execution under the Code of Civil Procedure, and criminal contempt will not lie in a private dispute absent clear obstruction of justice of the kind that affects the public at large.