Contempt requires intentional disobedience; administrative delay in order transmission and a substantially compliant bond do not establish contempt.

A contempt finding requires clear, intentional and contumacious disobedience of a court order; a delay caused by the ordinary administrative transmission or implementation of orders does not by itself amount to contempt. On the bond issue, a bond taken in substance to secure release of sale proceeds was valid even though no prescribed form existed and it was framed as an indemnity bond in favour of the Government of West Bengal, because it substantially complied with the Sessions Judge's direction. Acceptance of the bond by the Additional District Magistrate was not improper merely because the order referred to the District Magistrate, as the Criminal Procedure Code did not exclude the Additional District Magistrate's powers and the practice of the courts supported such acceptance.

---

---

Issues: Whether the appellants were guilty of contempt for the alleged disobedience of the Sessions Judge's order and the delayed transmission and implementation of the stay and related orders; and whether the bond accepted in favour of the depositor was so defective that the money could not lawfully be paid out.

Analysis: The order of the Sessions Judge required delivery of the sale proceeds on the furnishing of a bond to the satisfaction of the District Magistrate. There was no prescribed form of bond, and the bond actually taken, though framed as an indemnity bond in favour of the Government of West Bengal, substantially complied with the order and was enforceable. Acceptance of the bond by the Additional District Magistrate could not be treated as improper merely because the District Magistrate was mentioned in the order, as the Criminal Procedure Code did not exclude the powers of the Additional District Magistrate and the practice of the courts supported such acceptance. As to contempt, the material did not establish a deliberate scheme to defeat the stay order. The delay in transmission and handling of the orders was regrettable, but it was attributable to the ordinary system through which superior court orders passed and not to design, defiance, or contumacious conduct. In contempt jurisdiction, punishment is justified only where disobedience is clear and intentional, not where the matter is explainable as delay or administrative lapse.

Conclusion: The appellants were not guilty of contempt, and their convictions and fines could not stand.

Ratio Decidendi: Contempt requires clear, intentional, and contumacious disobedience of a court order; a bona fide or explainable delay in the administrative transmission or implementation of orders does not by itself establish contempt.

---