Criminal contempt and bona fide judicial error: a mistaken order without wilful intent to obstruct justice does not attract liability.

Criminal contempt requires conduct calculated to obstruct or prejudice the due course of justice; a judicial officer is not liable merely because an order is wrong, irregular, or beyond jurisdiction if made in good faith without wilful intent to defeat justice. The Court found that the absence of a stay, the earlier refusal of interim relief, and the Magistrate's explanation that he acted on a High Court order indicating urgency negatived any deliberate design to obstruct the revision proceedings. The act was treated as an erroneous exercise of judgment rather than contumacious conduct, so the conviction and sentence for contempt were set aside.

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Issues: Whether the Magistrate's order directing release of timber during the pendency of revision proceedings amounted to criminal contempt of court.

Analysis: Criminal contempt requires conduct that is calculated to obstruct, interfere with, or prejudice the due course of justice. A judicial officer is not to be punished merely because an order is wrong, irregular, or even beyond jurisdiction if it was made in good faith and without a wilful design to defeat justice. The surrounding circumstances, including the absence of a stay order, the High Court's earlier refusal to grant interim relief, and the Magistrate's explanation that he acted on a High Court order showing urgency in removing the timber, were sufficient to negative any deliberate intention to obstruct the proceedings. At most, the act disclosed an erroneous exercise of judgment and not contumacious conduct.

Conclusion: The conviction and sentence for contempt were set aside, and the appeal by the Magistrate was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: A judicial officer does not commit criminal contempt by passing a mistaken order in the bona fide discharge of official duty unless the act is shown to be wilful and calculated to obstruct the course of justice.

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