Civil contempt requires wilful disobedience; resort to a statutory company-law remedy did not amount to contempt here.

Civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 requires wilful disobedience of a court order or wilful breach of an undertaking. The Court held that the respondents' approach to the company-law forum under Sections 397, 398 and 403 of the Companies Act, 1956 to resolve a management deadlock and obtain interim operational directions did not by itself amount to contempt. It noted that the forum had jurisdiction to pass interim orders, those orders remained binding unless set aside, and the petitioner had not successfully challenged them. As no wilful, deliberate or intentional disobedience was established, the contempt petition failed and civil contempt was not made out.

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Issues: Whether the respondents committed civil contempt by allegedly breaching the consent terms and undertakings recorded by the Court, and whether their recourse to the company-law forum to secure operational directions for the company amounted to contempt.

Analysis: Civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 requires wilful disobedience of a court order or wilful breach of an undertaking. The material placed before the Court showed that, after the earlier consent arrangements, the respondents approached the company-law forum under Sections 397, 398 and 403 of the Companies Act, 1956 to address a management deadlock and obtain interim operational directions. The Court noted that the forum had jurisdiction to pass interim orders, that such orders remained binding unless set aside, and that the petitioner had not successfully challenged those orders. The Court further held that mere resort to a statutory remedy does not constitute contempt, and that the record did not establish wilful, deliberate and intentional disobedience of the Court's directions.

Conclusion: The contempt petition was not made out and the respondents were not held guilty of civil contempt.

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