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Issues: Whether breach of a consent order, without an express written undertaking or an undertaking incorporated in the order, amounts to contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Analysis: The appeal turned on the distinction between a compromise or consent order and a clear undertaking given to the court. Contempt for breach is attracted only where there is an express undertaking by affidavit, application, or oral statement recorded in the order. The record did not contain any such undertaking by the appellant, and the consent order itself merely appointed a receiver and contained directions for cooperation. On that footing, non-compliance with the consent order could not be treated as wilful disobedience of an undertaking. The proper remedy for enforcement of a compromise or consent order lies in execution or other civil process, not contempt, unless the breach is of a specific undertaking to the court.
Conclusion: The alleged conduct did not constitute contempt under section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and the conviction was unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to relief because the order of detention for contempt could not stand in the absence of any proved undertaking to the court.
Ratio Decidendi: Breach of a consent order, by itself, is not contempt unless the contemner has given a clear and express undertaking to the court, or such undertaking is incorporated in the court's order.