Rent-control protection for licensed film studios bars arbitration and brings possession disputes within the special statutory forum.

Premises licensed for film production, together with machinery and fixtures, were held to fall within the rent-control definition of premises given on licence for business, so the licensee came within the statutory deeming provision and was treated as a tenant. The statute's exclusive forum for disputes between licensor and licensee concerning possession and related questions also meant that the parties could not contract out of that mandate by an arbitration clause. Because the dispute concerned possession of protected premises under a welfare rent-control regime, arbitration was held inoperative and the special statutory court remained the only competent forum.

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Issues: (i) whether studios and associated premises given on licence for the purpose of film production constituted "premises" given on licence for business within the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, so as to attract the deeming provision of tenancy; (ii) whether, in view of the exclusive jurisdiction conferred by section 28(1) of that Act and the underlying public policy, the dispute could be referred to arbitration and the arbitration clause treated as operative.

Issue (i): whether studios and associated premises given on licence for the purpose of film production constituted "premises" given on licence for business within the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, so as to attract the deeming provision of tenancy.

Analysis: The statutory scheme defined "premises" to include a building or part of a building given on licence, extended the expression to premises given on licence for business, and by section 15A deemed certain licensees in occupation on 1 February 1973 to be tenants. Reading the definitions together, the Court held that a building licensed for use in business does not cease to be "premises" merely because machinery and fixtures are also licensed for use with it. The agreement in question granted licence of the studios and other premises for film production simultaneously with the licence of machinery and equipment, and the premises formed part of the subject of the licence.

Conclusion: Yes. The studios and other premises were premises given on licence for business and fell within the protective scheme of the Act, with the licensee treated as a deemed tenant.

Issue (ii): whether, in view of the exclusive jurisdiction conferred by section 28(1) of that Act and the underlying public policy, the dispute could be referred to arbitration and the arbitration clause treated as operative.

Analysis: Section 28(1) conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the specified court for disputes between landlord and tenant or licensor and licensee concerning possession, licence fee, or questions arising under the Act, and excluded all other courts from such matters. The Court held that, because the Act is a welfare legislation embodying public policy, parties cannot contract out of the statutory forum by an arbitration clause. The real dispute was one as to possession of the licensed premises between a licensor-landlord and a licensee-tenant, and therefore fell within the exclusive forum created by the Act. The application for reference to arbitration was consequently untenable.

Conclusion: No. The dispute was not arbitrable, the Court of Small Causes alone had jurisdiction, and the arbitration clause could not be enforced.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded, the reference to arbitration failed, and the parties' dispute had to be pursued only before the special forum designated by the rent legislation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a rent-control statute gives exclusive jurisdiction to a special court for disputes concerning possession of protected premises and embodies a public policy of tenant protection, an arbitration agreement cannot override that statutory mandate.

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