Contempt by scandalising the court requires a real tendency to obstruct justice; fair bona fide criticism is not contempt.

Defamatory criticism of a judge amounts to contempt only where, in its content and manner of publication, it is calculated or likely to interfere with the due administration of justice or undermine public confidence in the courts. The power to punish for contempt is directed to preserving the administration of justice, not protecting judges from personal criticism. Fair, reasonable and bona fide criticism of judicial acts is permissible, and the surrounding circumstances, including limited publication and the genuineness of the complaint, are relevant in assessing any tendency to obstruct justice. On that basis, the appellants' conduct was not contemptuous; at most it was technical, and the contempt finding was set aside.

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Issues: Whether the appellants' resolutions and representations concerning two judicial officers amounted to contempt of court by scandalising the court.

Analysis: The power to punish for contempt exists to prevent interference with the course of justice and to maintain public confidence in the administration of law, not to protect judges personally from criticism. A defamatory imputation against a judge is not necessarily contempt unless, in the circumstances, it is calculated or likely to obstruct or interfere with the due administration of justice. Fair and reasonable criticism of judicial acts is permissible, and the surrounding circumstances, including the limited publication and the bona fide nature of the complaint, are relevant in deciding whether the statement tends to impair the administration of justice.

Conclusion: The appellants' conduct did not amount to contempt of court. At most, any contempt was technical, and the proceedings ought not to have been continued.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the finding of contempt was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: A defamatory criticism of a judge constitutes contempt only when, in the circumstances of its publication and content, it is likely to interfere with the due administration of justice or undermine public confidence in the courts; fair and bona fide criticism made without such tendency is not contempt.

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