Second appeal limits and self-acquired property rules govern interference with findings and validity of a post-partition sale.

In second appeal, the scope of interference is confined to substantial questions of law, and factual findings may be disturbed only in recognised exceptional cases such as no evidence, inadmissible evidence, ignored material evidence, or misapplication of settled principles. The High Court's fresh reappreciation of evidence and factual inquiry exceeded that limit. On title, property allotted after partition is treated as separate property unless a proved joint family nucleus funds the purchase or there is clear blending into common stock. As no reliable nucleus or blending was proved, the property was treated as self-acquired, and the sale by Defendant No.1 to Defendant No.2 was valid.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court, in second appeal, could interfere with concurrent or appellate findings by reappreciating evidence without a properly framed substantial question of law; (ii) Whether the suit property was joint family property or the self-acquired property of Defendant No.1, and whether the sale in favour of Defendant No.2 was valid.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court, in second appeal, could interfere with concurrent or appellate findings by reappreciating evidence without a properly framed substantial question of law?

Analysis: The scope of a second appeal is confined to substantial questions of law. Interference with findings of fact is permissible only within the limited exceptions recognised by law, such as findings based on no evidence, inadmissible evidence, ignored material evidence, or a wrong application of settled legal principles. The record showed that the first appellate court had examined the entire evidence and had reached a plausible conclusion. The High Court nonetheless undertook a fresh factual inquiry and reappreciated the evidence as if exercising first appellate jurisdiction. Such an approach exceeded the bounds of Section 100 and was not justified under the limited fact-determining power under Section 103.

Conclusion: The High Court's interference in second appeal was unsustainable and is set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the suit property was joint family property or the self-acquired property of Defendant No.1, and whether the sale in favour of Defendant No.2 was valid?

Analysis: After partition, the share allotted to a coparcener becomes his separate property, unless it is shown by clear evidence that the later acquisition was made from a proved joint family nucleus or that the property was voluntarily blended into the common stock. The plaintiffs failed to establish a reliable nucleus sufficient to fund the purchase, and the documentary and oral evidence supported the defence version that Defendant No.1 purchased the property with a loan and his own resources. The doctrine of blending was inapplicable because no clear intention to abandon separate ownership was proved. As the property was self-acquired, Defendant No.1 was competent to alienate it, and the sale deed executed by him in favour of Defendant No.2 could not be treated as invalid for want of coparcenary consent or legal necessity.

Conclusion: The suit property was the self-acquired property of Defendant No.1, and the sale in favour of Defendant No.2 was valid.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeds, the High Court's judgment is reversed, and the first appellate court's decree is restored.

Ratio Decidendi: In second appeal, factual findings cannot be displaced by a mere reappreciation of evidence unless the case falls within the recognised legal exceptions, and a property acquired after partition will be treated as self-acquired unless a proved joint family nucleus or clear blending is established.

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