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<h1>Appeal allowed and earlier decree restored; property held defendant's self-acquired under Section 103; sale deed valid</h1> <h3>ANGADI CHANDRANNA Versus SHANKAR & ORS</h3> SC allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the First Appellate Court's decree. The Court held the High Court improperly ... Seeking partition and separate possession of the suit property - right to sell the property - it is contended that the suit property was acquired by Defendant No.1 using joint family funds and should therefore be treated as ancestral - whether the suit property was ancestral or selfacquired property of Defendant No.1? - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the so-called substantial question of law framed by the High Court does not qualify to be a substantial question of law, rather the exercise of the High Court is a venture into the findings of the First Appellant Court by re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that the High Court can go into the findings of facts only if the First Appellate Court has failed to look into the law or evidence or considered inadmissible evidence or without evidence. Section 103 permits the High Court to go into the facts only when the courts below have not determined or rendered any finding on a crucial fact, despite evidence already available on record or after deciding the substantial question of law, the facts of a particular case demand re-determination. For the second limb of Section 103 to apply, there must first be a decision on the substantial question of law, to which the facts must be applied, to determine the issue in dispute. When the First Appellate Court in exercise of its jurisdiction has considered the entire evidence and rendered a finding, the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence just because another view is possible, when the view taken by the First Appellate Court is plausible and does not suffer from vice in law. When the determination of the High Court is only by way of re-appreciation of the existing evidence, without there being any legal question to be answered, it would be axiomatic that not even a question of law is involved, much less a substantial one. In the present case, the First Appellate Court analyzed the entire oral evidence adduced by both parties, as well as the documentary evidence relied upon by either side, and dismissed the suit. The authority to re-consider the evidence is available only to the First Appellate Court under Section 96 and not to the High Court in exercise of its authority under Section 100, unless the case falls under the exceptional circumstances provided under Section 103. While so, the re-appreciation of the entire evidence, including the contents of the exhibits, reliance on and wrongful identification of a different property and treating the same to be the suit property actually in dispute to prescribe another view without any substantial question of law, only illustrate the callousness of the High Court in applying the settled principles. Therefore, the High Court erred in setting aside the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court. In the instant case, the plaintiffs raised a specific plea throughout the proceedings that the suit property was purchased by Defendant No.1 using family nucleus viz., income derived from the lands allotted to the share of Defendant No.1; income derived from doing coolie work; cash of Rs.10,000/- received at the time of partition; and cash received from Mallamma (grandmother of the respondents) who sold her property at Rayadurga and therefore, the suit property should be treated as ancestral and the plaintiffs, who were co-parceners, have a right in it. The property in dispute is the property purchased by Defendant No.1 from his brother C. Thippeswamy. The High Court rather than ascertaining as to how this property was acquired, it erroneously went into a fact- finding inquiry in the Second Appeal regarding the property received by Defendant No.1 under a Will, a narration of which is found in the recital of the partition deed. The High Court even failed to notice that the partition took place in 1986, whereas, the suit property was purchased only in 1989. This deviation, in our view, has further contributed to the miscarriage of justice - taking note of the facts and circumstances of the case and also the principles enunciated in the above decisions, in our considered opinion, Defendant No.1 acquired the suit property out of the loan obtained from DW3 and not from the income derived from the nucleus funds or joint family funds, and hence, the suit property should be considered as his self-acquired property. As such, Defendant No.1 has the right to sell the suit property and accordingly, the sale deed executed by him in favour of Defendant No.2 is perfectly valid. Regarding the doctrine of blending of self-acquired property with joint family, it is settled law that property separate or self- acquired of a member of joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by the owner into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein but to establish such abandonment a clear intention to waive separate rights must be established. From the mere fact that other members of the family were allowed to use the property jointly with himself, or that the income of the separate property was utilized out of generosity to support persons whom the holder was either bound or not bound to support, or from the failure to maintain separate accounts, abandonment cannot be inferred, for an act of generosity or kindness, will not ordinarily be regarded as an admission of a legal obligation - the High Court erroneously applied the doctrine of blending under the Hindu joint family law by relying upon judgments that are not applicable to the case on hand, re-appreciated evidence without framing any substantial question of law and allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiffs. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside, and the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court is restored - Appeal allowed. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether the question framed by the High Court in the second appeal under Section 100 CPC amounted to a substantial question of law permitting re-appreciation of facts, or was an impermissible re-appreciation of evidence and findings of the first appellate court. 2. Whether the suit property, purchased by a brother after a registered partition, was ancestral/joint family property (acquired from the joint family nucleus) or was self-acquired by the purchaser, entitling him to alienate it freely. 3. Whether the doctrine of blending (voluntary throwing of self-acquired property into the joint family stock) applied, and if so, whether there was sufficient evidence of intention to abandon separate ownership. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1: Scope of High Court's jurisdiction in a Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC - whether the High Court framed and decided a substantial question of law or impermissibly re-appreciated evidence. Legal framework: Section 100 CPC limits the High Court's appellate jurisdiction to substantial questions of law; Section 103 CPC permits determination of issues of fact only in narrow circumstances (issues not determined below or wrongly determined due to a decision on a question of law). Established principles require that the High Court should not re-appreciate evidence simply because another view is possible; interference is permissible where findings are contrary to mandatory legal principles, based on inadmissible evidence, or where courts below ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence. Precedent treatment: The Court relied on and followed authoritative precedents delineating the High Court's limited scope in second appeals (including principles extracted from prior decisions emphasizing substantial questions of law, exceptions under Section 103 and the prohibition against mere re-appraisal of evidence). Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the High Court's so-called substantial question of law did not qualify as such but was in substance a re-appreciation of evidence and a venture into factual controversy already considered by the first appellate court. The Court reiterated that Section 103 empowers the High Court to examine facts only when (a) an issue was undetermined by lower courts, or (b) facts require re-determination after a decision on a substantial question of law; neither condition existed. The first appellate court had analyzed oral and documentary evidence and reached a plausible view; the High Court impermissibly substituted its view without a legally cognizable basis for interference. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - High Court in a second appeal cannot re-appreciate evidence and substitute its own view unless one of the recognized exceptions under Sections 100/103 CPC is met. Obiter - extended commentary on negligence/callousness of courts in applying Section 100 principles (illustrative but supportive of ratio). Conclusion: The High Court erred in entertaining and deciding a non-substantial question of law by re-appreciating evidence; its interference was not sustainable and warranted setting aside of its order insofar as it reversed the first appellate court. Issue 2: Character of the suit property - ancestral/joint family property by virtue of acquisition from a family nucleus versus self-acquired property of the purchaser. Legal framework: Under Hindu law, property inherited from paternal ancestors up to three generations is ancestral; where an acquisition is alleged to be from a joint family nucleus, the party asserting ancestry must prove existence and sufficiency of the nucleus. If a nucleus is proved, a presumption arises that the acquisition was from it, shifting burden to the defendant to prove self-acquisition. Conversely, property allotted on partition ordinarily becomes the self-acquired property of each sharer. The doctrine of blending applies only where a self-acquired property is voluntarily thrown into the joint stock with clear intention to abandon separate rights. Precedent treatment: The Court applied established authorities on nucleus, burden of proof, character of property post-partition, and blending (citing settled principles that nucleus must be proved, the distinction between coparcenary/joint family property and separate property post-partition, and standards for inferring abandonment). Interpretation and reasoning: The Court examined the partition deed, sale deeds, and oral evidence. The partition deed allocated distinct plots; the suit property was allotted to one brother (not to the defendant) and later sold to the defendant by registered sale. Evidence adduced by defendants (DW1-DW4 and documentary records) supported that the purchaser used a loan from DW3 to buy the suit property and repaid the loan by a later alienation. The partition deed did not record any Rs.10,000 payment to the purchaser's share nor documentary proof of cash from a grandmother; plaintiffs' oral assertions lacked corroboration and contradicted documentary recitals. The Court emphasized that mere existence of a joint family does not create a presumption that every acquisition is joint family property; the plaintiffs bore the onus to establish a nucleus adequate to have funded the purchase. No reliable record showed that other allotted properties yielded income or that sale proceeds/nucleus funded the transaction. The first appellate court's finding that the property was self-acquired was plausible and supported by evidence; the High Court's contrary conclusion resulted from re-appreciation and misidentification of properties (erroneously treating a will-acquired property as the suit property). The Court also observed that use of sale proceeds for family benefit (e.g., marriage) can constitute use for legal necessity by the karta and not necessarily evidence of joint family acquisition. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Where a partition has occurred and a party purchases property thereafter, the party asserting that the purchase was from a joint family nucleus must prove existence and sufficiency of such nucleus and a nexus to the acquisition; absent such proof and where credible evidence shows self-acquisition (e.g., loan followed by repayment), the property is self-acquired and alienation is valid. Obiter - remarks on customary practices of marriage expenses as acts of necessity by a karta (illustrative guidance). Conclusion: The suit property was self-acquired by the purchaser (having been bought from the brother by funds/loan shown in evidence), not ancestral/joint family property; therefore the purchaser had the right to sell and the sale to the present defendant was valid. The plaintiffs failed to discharge the burden of proving acquisition from the joint family nucleus. Issue 3: Application of the doctrine of blending - whether self-acquired property blended into the joint family stock in the facts of the case. Legal framework: Blending requires clear evidence of voluntary surrender or abandonment of separate ownership and an intention to throw the property into the common stock; mere use by family members, generosity, or failure to maintain separate accounts is insufficient to infer abandonment. Precedent treatment: The Court applied settled authorities requiring clear intention and conduct to establish blending and warned against inferring blending from acts of kindness or familial use. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found no evidence that the property allegedly received by way of will (which the High Court misapplied to the suit property) blended with joint family property or that income from any such property funded the suit purchase. Plaintiffs produced no documents proving blending or nexus of funds. The factual record instead supported that the suit property was purchased separately with loan funds and repaid by later alienation. The High Court's invocation of blending relied on inapplicable judgments and mis-identification of properties and therefore could not sustain a finding of blending. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Blending cannot be inferred on tenuous or unrelated facts; clear evidence of intention to abandon separate rights is required. Obiter - criticism of misapplication of blending doctrine by the High Court in this case. Conclusion: The doctrine of blending did not apply on the facts; no clear intention or evidence established abandonment of separate ownership, and the High Court erred in applying the doctrine to substitute the first appellate court's factual conclusion. Final Disposition (linked to issues): Because the High Court impermissibly re-appreciated evidence in a second appeal and misapplied principles regarding ancestral property, nucleus and blending, its order was set aside and the judgment of the first appellate court (which found the property to be self-acquired and the sale valid) was restored.