Letters Patent Appeal barred after Section 100A amendment where Single Judge decided a Motor Vehicles Act appeal.

Amended Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was read as a non obstante bar overriding the Letters Patent and any other law, so no further Letters Patent Appeal lay from a Single Judge's judgment in an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The right of appeal was treated as a vested statutory right that may be taken away by express words or necessary implication, and the absence of any provision in the Motor Vehicles Act for a second appeal confirmed the bar. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent could not survive against this statutory exclusion, and no intra-court appeal was maintainable.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether, after the amendment to Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 with effect from 1 July 2002, a Letters Patent Appeal lay against a judgment of a Single Judge rendered in appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; (ii) whether a further intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was maintainable in such matters.

Issue (i): Whether, after the amendment to Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 with effect from 1 July 2002, a Letters Patent Appeal lay against a judgment of a Single Judge rendered in appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Analysis: Section 100A was construed as a non obstante provision giving overriding effect over the Letters Patent and any other law. The right of appeal was treated as a statutory and vested right, but one that can be taken away expressly or by necessary intendment. As the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 contains no provision conferring a further appeal from the appellate judgment of a Single Judge, and the appeal under Section 173 is itself a statutory appeal from the award of the Claims Tribunal, the amended Section 100A bars any further appeal.

Conclusion: The Letters Patent Appeal was held not maintainable on this ground.

Issue (ii): Whether a further intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was maintainable in such matters.

Analysis: Clause 15 was held to be subject to later legislation and cannot survive where a specific statutory bar is enacted. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was treated as a tribunal with the trappings of a court, and an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was held to be governed by the statutory scheme. In view of the express exclusion created by Section 100A, Clause 15 could not be invoked to sustain a second appeal against the judgment of the Single Judge.

Conclusion: The intra-court appeal under Clause 15 was held not maintainable.

Final Conclusion: The Court answered both questions against the appellants and held that no Letters Patent Appeal lay against the Single Judge's appellate judgment under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; the appeals were dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute expressly bars any further appeal after a Single Judge decides an appeal from an original or appellate order, the Letters Patent cannot be used to create a surviving intra-court appeal.

---