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Issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff had complied with the mandatory requirement of pleading and proving readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; (ii) whether the plaintiff was entitled to discretionary relief of specific performance in view of delay, conduct, and the principles governing exercise of discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Issue (i): Whether the plaintiff had complied with the mandatory requirement of pleading and proving readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Analysis: A suit for specific performance requires not only an averment in the plaint that the plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract, but also proof of such readiness and willingness. A vague recital or a late notice issued after expiry of the contractual period does not satisfy the statutory mandate. The plaintiff had neither made a proper averment nor established any timely demand on the owner or tender of the balance consideration within the stipulated period.
Conclusion: The requirement of Section 16(c) was not satisfied and the claim for specific performance could not be maintained on that basis.
Issue (ii): Whether the plaintiff was entitled to discretionary relief of specific performance in view of delay, conduct, and the principles governing exercise of discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Analysis: Specific performance is an equitable and discretionary relief, and the claimant must act with diligence and come with clean hands. The plaintiff approached the court after a substantial delay, failed to show any timely steps to enforce the contract against the owner, and sought relief only after learning of the later sale. In such circumstances, the courts below had declined discretion, and the High Court ought not to have interfered without showing that the discretion had been exercised on an erroneous principle.
Conclusion: The plaintiff was not entitled to discretionary relief of specific performance.
Final Conclusion: The decree granting specific performance was unsustainable, and the decision restoring dismissal of the suit gave effect to the mandatory statutory requirements and equitable limitations governing such relief.
Ratio Decidendi: In a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must both plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract, and even where this threshold is crossed, the relief remains discretionary and may be refused for delay or inequitable conduct.