Corruption law and judicial accountability: superior court Judges fall within public servant coverage, with sanction safeguards for prosecution.

A Judge of the superior judiciary is treated as a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, because the Act adopts the wider IPC definition and constitutional status does not create immunity from criminal prosecution. For sanction, the competent authority is the President, as removal of such Judges lies with the President under the Constitution, with consultation of the Chief Justice of India noted as a safeguard. The article also explains that section 5(1)(e) concerns possession of assets disproportionate to known income: the prosecution must first prove disproportion, after which the accused must satisfactorily account for the property. It further states that the charge-sheet need not contain a quasi-adjudicatory finding on the explanation.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether a Judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court is a public servant liable to prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, including for criminal misconduct under section 5(1)(e). (ii) Whether previous sanction under section 6(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was required and, if so, who was the competent authority. (iii) Whether the charge-sheet was invalid for want of an opportunity to explain disproportionate assets and for non-compliance with the ingredients of section 5(1)(e).

Issue (i): Whether a Judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court is a public servant liable to prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, including for criminal misconduct under section 5(1)(e).

Analysis: The Act adopts the meaning of public servant from section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which expressly includes every Judge. The majority held that the constitutional status of Judges does not take them outside the penal law. The special constitutional protection relating to removal from office does not create immunity from criminal prosecution. The Act was treated as a measure to suppress corruption in public administration and was construed to include superior Judges within the definition of public servant.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the appellant. Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts fall within the expression public servant and are not exempt from the Act.

Issue (ii): Whether previous sanction under section 6(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was required and, if so, who was the competent authority.

Analysis: Section 6 bars cognizance unless sanction is obtained from the authority competent to remove the public servant from office. The majority held that for Judges of the superior judiciary the President is the competent authority because removal can be effected only by an order of the President under Article 124(4) read with Article 218 of the Constitution. To preserve judicial independence, the Court directed that the Chief Justice of India be consulted before registration of a criminal case and at the stage of sanction, and that due regard be given to that opinion. On the facts, however, no sanction was necessary because the appellant had already ceased to be a public servant before cognizance was taken.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of the respondent in principle. The President was held to be the competent authority for sanction, subject to consultation with the Chief Justice of India, and no sanction was required in the present case because the appellant had retired.

Issue (iii): Whether the charge-sheet was invalid for want of an opportunity to explain disproportionate assets and for non-compliance with the ingredients of section 5(1)(e).

Analysis: The Court held that section 5(1)(e) creates a substantive offence when the prosecution proves possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to known sources of income and the accused cannot satisfactorily account for it. The prosecution bears the initial burden, after which the accused carries an evidential burden to account for the assets on a preponderance of probabilities. The Investigating Officer is not required to conduct a quasi-adjudicatory inquiry or to record a formal finding on the sufficiency of the accused's explanation before filing the report. The charge-sheet was found to contain the requisite particulars under section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the appellant. The charge-sheet was held valid and the ingredients of section 5(1)(e) were not found deficient.

Final Conclusion: The majority upheld the prosecution in law and rejected the challenge to the criminal proceedings, while laying down safeguards requiring consultation with the Chief Justice of India before action against a Judge of the superior judiciary.

Ratio Decidendi: A Judge of the superior judiciary is a public servant within the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947; criminal prosecution is maintainable subject to prior sanction by the authority competent to remove the Judge from office, and the offence under section 5(1)(e) is made out once the prosecution proves disproportionate assets, after which the accused must satisfactorily account for them.

---