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Issues: (i) Whether the expression "any property" in Section 102(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 includes immovable property. (ii) Whether the law laid down in State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy is confined to bank accounts and does not extend to immovable property. (iii) Which of the conflicting Division Bench decisions correctly states the law on seizure of immovable property under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Issue (i): Whether the expression "any property" in Section 102(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 includes immovable property.
Analysis: The majority examined Section 102 as a whole and compared it with other provisions of the Code where the legislature expressly used distinct expressions such as "movable property", "immovable property", "attachment", and "seizure". It held that the scheme of Section 102, read with the requirement of reporting seizure to the Magistrate and the provisions governing custody and disposal, did not justify expanding "any property" to include immovable property. The majority also relied on the contextual limits of the word "property" in a procedural provision and declined to supply an omitted term by judicial interpretation.
Conclusion: The expression "any property" in Section 102(1) does not include immovable property, and immovable property cannot be seized under that provision.
Issue (ii): Whether the law laid down in State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy is confined to bank accounts and does not extend to immovable property.
Analysis: The majority held that Tapas D. Neogy considered the seizability of bank accounts and the meaning of property in that context, and did not decide the question of immovable property. It emphasised that a judgment is an authority only for what it actually decides and cannot be extended by logical deduction to a distinct question not before the Court. On that basis, the earlier Supreme Court ruling was treated as confined to bank accounts.
Conclusion: Tapas D. Neogy is restricted to bank accounts and cannot be extended to immovable property.
Issue (iii): Which of the conflicting Division Bench decisions correctly states the law on seizure of immovable property under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: The majority preferred the earlier view that immovable property is outside Section 102 and held that the later decision extending the provision to immovable property had not correctly applied the Supreme Court's ruling in Tapas D. Neogy. It concluded that the interpretation adopted in the earlier Division Bench decision accords with the language and structure of the provision.
Conclusion: The earlier Division Bench decision stating that immovable property cannot be seized under Section 102 lays down the correct law.
Final Conclusion: The reference was answered by holding that Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not authorise seizure of immovable property, and the Supreme Court's ruling in Tapas D. Neogy was confined to bank accounts.
Ratio Decidendi: A procedural provision authorising seizure of "any property" cannot be extended to immovable property where the statutory scheme and context indicate that the provision is confined to property capable of seizure in the sense contemplated by the Code, and a precedent is binding only on the precise question actually decided.