1980 (12) TMI 181 - SC - Indian Laws

Tribunal's Jurisdiction to Set Aside Award and Continue Proceedings

GRINDLAYS BANK LTD. Versus CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & ORS.

The Tribunal had jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award based on procedural defects, not a review on merits. The Tribunal retained jurisdiction ... Whether the Tribunal had any jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award, particularly when it was based on evidence? Whether the Tribunal became functus officio on the expiry of the 30 days from the date of publication of the ex parte award under s. 17, by reason of sub-s. (3) of s. 20 and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the award and the Central Government alone had the power under sub-s. (1) of s. 17-A to set it aside? Held that:- Unable to appreciate the contention that merely because the ex parte award was based on the statement of the manager of the appellant, the order setting aside the ex parte award, in fact, amounts to review. In a case in which the Tribunal or other body makes an ex parte award, the provisions of O. IX, r. 13 of the Code are clearly attracted. It logically follows that the Tribunal was competent to entertain an application to set aside an ex parte award. That award was published by the Central Government in the Gazette of India dated December 25, 1976. The application for setting aside the ex parte award was filed by respondent No. 3, acting on behalf of respondents Nos. 5 to 17 on January 19, 1977 i.e., before the expiry of 30 days of its publication and was, therefore, rightly entertained by the Tribunal. It had jurisdiction to entertain it and decide it on merits. It was, however, urged that on April 12, 1977 the date on which the impugned order was passed the Tribunal had in any event become functus officio. We cannot accede to this argument. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal had to be seen on the date of the application made to it and not the date on which it passed the impugned order. There is no finality attached to an ex parte award because it is always subject to its being set aside on sufficient cause being shown. The Tribunal had the power to deal with an application properly made before it for setting aside the ex parte award and pass suitable orders. Appeal dismissed. Issues Involved:1. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to set aside an ex parte award.2. Whether the Tribunal becomes functus officio after the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the ex parte award.Detailed Analysis:1. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to Set Aside an Ex Parte AwardThe primary issue is whether the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte award, especially when it was based on evidence. The contention was that neither the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 nor the rules framed thereunder confer any powers upon the Tribunal to set aside an ex parte award. It was argued that the award, although ex parte, was an adjudication on merits based on the evidence led by the appellant, and thus, the application made by the respondent was essentially a review rather than a mere setting aside of an ex parte award.The judgment emphasized that the Industrial Disputes Act aims to ensure social justice and resolve disputes between employers and employees to avoid strikes or lockouts. The Tribunal was considered to have ancillary or incidental powers necessary to discharge its functions effectively for doing justice between the parties. The Tribunal's power to follow such procedure as it deems fit, as per Section 11(1) of the Act, was highlighted. This provision grants the Tribunal wide procedural discretion, akin to the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, allows the Tribunal to proceed ex parte if a party fails to attend without sufficient cause. The Tribunal's power to set aside an ex parte award was inferred from its power to proceed ex parte, contingent upon the absence of sufficient cause for non-appearance. The Tribunal's power to grant adjournments under Rule 24(b) was also noted, likening it to the civil court's discretion under Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure.The judgment clarified that the setting aside of an ex parte award does not equate to a review on merits but is more akin to correcting a procedural defect. The Tribunal's jurisdiction to entertain an application to set aside an ex parte award was affirmed, noting that such power is inherent in every court or Tribunal to prevent abuse of its process.2. Tribunal Becoming Functus OfficioThe second issue was whether the Tribunal became functus officio after the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the ex parte award under Section 17, thereby losing jurisdiction to set aside the award. The judgment explained that under Section 20(3) of the Act, the proceedings before the Tribunal are deemed to continue until the award becomes enforceable under Section 17A. An award becomes enforceable 30 days after its publication under Section 17.In this case, the ex parte award was made on December 9, 1976, and published on December 25, 1976. The application to set aside the ex parte award was filed on January 19, 1977, within 30 days of its publication. Therefore, the Tribunal retained jurisdiction over the dispute and had the power to entertain and decide the application on merits. The Tribunal's jurisdiction is determined by the date of the application, not the date of the order.The judgment concluded that the Tribunal had the authority to set aside the ex parte award and directed the matter to be heard afresh, ensuring justice and adherence to procedural fairness.Conclusion:The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Tribunal's jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award and rejecting the contention that the Tribunal had become functus officio. The Tribunal's powers to regulate its procedure and ensure fair adjudication were upheld, reinforcing the principles of justice and procedural equity in industrial dispute resolution.