Prospectivity of interim compensation and appellate deposit provisions under the Negotiable Instruments Act turns on whether the liability is substantive or procedural.

Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act was held to create a substantive liability because it authorises interim compensation at trial with coercive recovery consequences, so it was held prospective and inapplicable to pending complaints and trials. Section 148 was treated as a procedural appellate mechanism because it only requires a partial deposit against an already determined fine or compensation, without creating a new substantive burden; it was therefore held applicable to pending appeals. The challenge to the trial-stage orders succeeded, while the challenge to the appellate-stage orders failed.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be applied to complaints and trials already pending on the date of its commencement. (ii) Whether Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be applied to appeals pending on the date of its commencement.

Issue (i): Whether Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be applied to complaints and trials already pending on the date of its commencement.

Analysis: Section 143-A creates a power to direct interim compensation at the trial stage and links non-payment to recovery as if it were a fine. The provision was not expressed to operate retrospectively. The Court held that the liability it creates is a substantive obligation because it imposes an enforceable monetary burden during the trial, with coercive consequences affecting property rights under the recovery mechanism. It was further held that the section is not merely a step in trial procedure, because it creates an independent liability outside the ordinary progression of the trial and does not merely regulate the conduct of the proceedings.

Conclusion: Section 143-A was held to be prospective and inapplicable to pending trials; the challenge to trial court orders was allowed.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be applied to appeals pending on the date of its commencement.

Analysis: Section 148 regulates the appellate stage by authorising a minimum deposit of a part of the fine or compensation already awarded by the trial court. The Court held that the appellant has no vested right to prosecute an appeal under any particular procedural mode, and that the provision does not create a new substantive liability because the conviction and monetary liability already stand determined by the trial court. The section was treated as a procedural modification of the existing recovery framework under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and as beneficial to the appellant inasmuch as it gives only partial deposit and additional breathing space during the appeal.

Conclusion: Section 148 was held to apply to pending appeals; the challenge to appellate court orders was dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The amendment introducing interim compensation at the trial stage was held not to govern pending trials, whereas the appellate deposit mechanism was held to govern pending appeals.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory provision is retrospective only if its language so provides or necessarily implies it; a provision creating a new enforceable liability with coercive consequences is substantive and prospective, while a provision modifying the appellate recovery procedure without creating a new substantive disability is procedural and applies to pending appeals.

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