Amended arbitration enforcement law displaces the deemed stay and bars execution of award portions already set aside or remanded.

Amended Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applies to pending Section 34 challenges where the arbitral proceedings had already concluded before the amendment, and the earlier deemed stay does not continue merely because the challenge was still pending; a separate stay application is required. Execution cannot proceed against any portion of an award that has already been set aside and remanded, because that part is no longer executable. The award also does not need transmission like a civil court decree for execution in another forum, but that does not revive enforcement for the remanded portion. The garnishee order was therefore unsustainable only to the extent it covered the non-executable items.

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Issues: (i) Whether the amended Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as brought in by the amending legislation, applies to pending proceedings under Section 34 and removes the earlier deemed stay; (ii) whether the garnishee order could be sustained in respect of the award portion that had already been set aside and remanded, and whether the award needed transmission for execution.

Issue (i): Whether the amended Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as brought in by the amending legislation, applies to pending proceedings under Section 34 and removes the earlier deemed stay.

Analysis: The decision turned on the language of the amended provision and the saving clause. The arbitral proceedings had commenced and had also culminated in an award before the amendment, but the Section 34 challenge was still pending when the amendment came into force. The Court held that Section 26 of the amending Act makes the amended regime applicable where the arbitral proceedings had terminated before commencement of the amendment, and that the pendency of a Section 34 petition does not preserve the pre-amendment deemed stay. The earlier automatic stay under Section 36 was treated as a procedural advantage that stood displaced by the new provision, which requires a separate stay application.

Conclusion: The amended Section 36 applied, the deemed stay under the unamended provision was unavailable, and the petitioner could not rely on the pre-amendment regime.

Issue (ii): Whether the garnishee order could be sustained in respect of the award portion that had already been set aside and remanded, and whether the award needed transmission for execution.

Analysis: The execution was sought on the basis of the award and connected orders, but the portion relating to items 1 to 25 had already been set aside and remanded, leaving no executable award for that part. The Court held that execution could not proceed on a claim that had ceased to be enforceable by reason of the higher court's order. On the question of transmission, the Court accepted that an arbitral award does not require transfer in the manner of a civil court decree for execution in another forum. However, that did not cure the absence of an executable award for the remanded portion.

Conclusion: The garnishee order was unsustainable to the extent it covered items 1 to 25 and was set aside for that part, while it was maintained for the remaining executable portion.

Final Conclusion: The revision was allowed in part: the execution process was curtailed for the portion of the award that was no longer executable, but the remainder of the garnishee order was left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where arbitral proceedings had already terminated before the amendment and the award challenge remained pending, the amended Section 36 displaced the earlier deemed stay, and execution could not proceed on any portion of the award that had been set aside or remanded and had therefore ceased to be executable.

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