Arbitration enforcement amendment: no vested right to automatic stay, and amended Section 36 applies to pending Section 34 challenges.

Section 26 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 was treated as exhaustive, because its wording deliberately distinguished proceedings before the arbitral tribunal from post-award court proceedings; Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 therefore did not preserve a contrary position for pending post-award matters. The amended Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was held to apply to Section 34 petitions filed before 23 October 2015 and still pending on that date, since the old automatic stay on enforcement was only a procedural advantage and not a vested right. The right to challenge an award under Section 34 remained unaffected, but the earlier suspension of execution did not survive the amendment.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether the savings provision in Section 26 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 is exhaustive so as to exclude the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to pending post-award proceedings; and (ii) whether the amended Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applies to Section 34 petitions filed before 23 October 2015 and pending on that date.

Issue (i): Whether the savings provision in Section 26 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 is exhaustive so as to exclude the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to pending post-award proceedings.

Analysis: The distinction drawn in Section 26 between proceedings commenced "to arbitral proceedings" and those "in relation to arbitral proceedings" was treated as deliberate. The term "arbitral proceedings" was confined to proceedings before the arbitral tribunal and not to post-award court proceedings. The use of the restrictive phrase in the first limb, contrasted with the wider language in the second limb, indicated a conscious legislative choice to keep post-award proceedings outside the saving clause. In that setting, the saving provision was held to be complete in itself and not a case where Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 could be invoked to preserve a contrary position.

Conclusion: Section 26 was held to be exhaustive, and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 did not assist the applicants.

Issue (ii): Whether the amended Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applies to Section 34 petitions filed before 23 October 2015 and pending on that date.

Analysis: The court held that the substitution of Section 36 removed the earlier automatic suspension of enforcement and merely altered the manner in which enforceability would operate in future. The pre-amendment position did not confer a vested or accrued right on the award-debtor to resist execution merely because a Section 34 petition had been filed. Section 34 remained intact as the challenge mechanism, but the interim shield against enforcement under the old Section 36 was only a procedural advantage and not a substantive right. The amendment was therefore treated as operating prospectively on existing pending matters, without affecting the right to challenge the award.

Conclusion: The amended Section 36 was held applicable to pending Section 34 petitions filed before 23 October 2015.

Final Conclusion: The chamber summonses failed because the amended enforcement regime governed the pending challenges to the awards, while the applicants retained only their challenge under Section 34 and no vested right to automatic suspension of execution.

Ratio Decidendi: A party challenging an arbitral award has a vested right to pursue the Section 34 remedy, but no vested or accrued right to automatic suspension of enforcement under the pre-amendment Section 36; the substituted Section 36 applies prospectively to pending enforcement situations unless the saving clause clearly preserves the contrary position.

---