Supreme Court rules on retrospective application of amended law, emphasizes appellate court finality

The Supreme Court held that the amended Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rents Act should not be applied retrospectively to cases pending before the High Court. The Court emphasized that the High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code instead of the amended provision. The finality of appellate court orders delivered before the amendment was affirmed, and the Court set aside the High Court's order, remanding the case to be dealt with under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The judgment highlighted the importance of not disturbing substantive rights existing at the commencement of litigation unless expressly provided for by the legislature.

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Issues Involved:
1. Retrospective application of the amended Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.
2. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code versus the amended Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rents Act.
3. Finality of appellate court orders prior to the amendment.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Retrospective Application of the Amended Section 29(2):
The primary issue was whether the amendment to Section 29(2) by the Gujarat Amendment Act, 1965, should be applied retrospectively to cases pending before the High Court. The Supreme Court noted that "there is no dispute that s. 29(2) as amended has not expressly been given retrospective operation." Citing Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, the Court held that "provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment." The Court further emphasized that the finality of orders existing before the amendment should not be disturbed retrospectively unless explicitly stated by the legislature.

2. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code versus the Amended Section 29(2):
The appeal questioned whether the High Court could exercise its jurisdiction under the amended Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rents Act, which conferred broader revisional powers, or if it was limited to the jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Supreme Court highlighted that "by the amended Act the High Court is expressly invested with revisional jurisdiction, which is not subject to the restrictions prescribed by s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure." However, the Court ultimately concluded that the High Court should have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, as the amendment did not have retrospective effect. The Court stated, "the revision petition when originally filed was triable under s. 115-Civil Procedure Code; it has been tried by the High Court under the amended s. 29(2) of the Rents, Rates Control Act."

3. Finality of Appellate Court Orders Prior to the Amendment:
The Court examined whether the finality of the appellate court's order, which was delivered before the amendment, could be affected by the new provisions. The Supreme Court referred to previous judgments, including Indira Sohan Lal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property Delhi and Dafedar Niranjan Singh and Another v. Custodian Evacuee Property (Pb.), to distinguish between procedural changes and substantive rights. The Court observed that "the order of the appellate court, subject to scrutiny by the High Court within the limited field permitted by s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was final." The Court concluded that the amendment did not have retrospective application and thus could not affect the finality of orders passed before its enactment.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and remanding the case to the High Court to be dealt with under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Court emphasized that the amendment to Section 29(2) did not have retrospective effect and that the High Court's jurisdiction should be confined to the provisions existing at the time the revision petition was filed. The judgment underscored the principle that substantive rights existing at the time of litigation commencement should not be altered by subsequent legislative amendments unless explicitly stated.

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