Pre-emption rights survived repeal, and a retrospective amendment applied to pending appeals to defeat an inconsistent decree.

A statutory right of pre-emption under the Punjab Preemption Act, 1913 was held to survive repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900 because the right was preserved by incorporation and the later Act continued independently. The restriction on holding and disposing of property was upheld as reasonable, being linked to preserving village integrity and family-based land retention. The 1960 amendment to section 15(c) thirdly, read with the retrospective clause in section 31, was treated as applying to pending appeals as well as suits, so an inconsistent pre-emption decree could not be sustained.

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Issues: (i) Whether section 15(a) of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1913 remained operative after repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900 and, if operative, whether it imposed an unreasonable restriction on the right to hold and dispose of property under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India. (ii) Whether section 15(c) thirdly, as amended by the Punjab Preemption (Amendment) Act, 1960, and the retrospective clause in section 31 applied to a pending appeal so as to defeat a pre-emption decree already passed.

Issue (i): Whether section 15(a) of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1913 remained operative after repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900 and, if operative, whether it imposed an unreasonable restriction on the right to hold and dispose of property under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The opening words of section 15, read with sections 14 and 23 and the definitions incorporated from the earlier land law, did not make the right of pre-emption disappear on repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900. The definition of agricultural land was treated as incorporated by reference, and the repeal of the earlier Act did not affect the later enactment. The fetters created by sections 14 and 23 fell away, but the substantive right under section 15 continued to operate. On constitutionality, the restriction was examined against Article 19(5) by reference to the object of preserving village integrity and keeping the property within the family through the agnatic rule of succession. The Court treated those purposes as sufficient to sustain the restriction as one in the interests of the general public.

Conclusion: Section 15(a) remained operative and was upheld as a reasonable restriction; the challenge failed.

Issue (ii): Whether section 15(c) thirdly, as amended by the Punjab Preemption (Amendment) Act, 1960, and the retrospective clause in section 31 applied to a pending appeal so as to defeat a pre-emption decree already passed.

Analysis: The amended provision removed the class of persons who claimed pre-emption merely as owners of land in the estate, and section 31 expressly barred courts from passing a decree inconsistent with the amended Act in suits instituted before or after its commencement. The language was treated as sufficiently plain and comprehensive to govern pending appeals as well as decrees under challenge. Since appellate proceedings are a continuation of the suit and the appellate court also passes a decree, the subsequent amendment had to be applied to the pending appeal.

Conclusion: The amended law applied retrospectively to the pending appeal, and the pre-emption decree could not stand.

Final Conclusion: The constitutional challenge to section 15(a) failed, but the appeal governed by the 1960 amendment succeeded because the later statutory change controlled the pending appellate proceeding and displaced the earlier decree.

Ratio Decidendi: A right of pre-emption preserved by incorporation from an earlier statute survives repeal of that earlier statute, and a clear retrospective amendment expressed to govern pending suits or appeals must be applied by the appellate court to any decree inconsistent with the amended law.

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