Statutory limitation and sufficient cause govern condonation of delay; prolonged inaction defeats late appeals.

Delay in filing an appeal beyond the statutory limitation period was not condoned because the explanation for an 832-day delay showed inaction and negligence rather than sufficient cause. The limitation framework governing appeals from the Appellate Tribunal was treated as controlling, and condonation was held not to be routine where the opposite party had acquired a vested right by expiry of limitation. The appeal was therefore not maintainable beyond limitation.

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Issues: Whether the delay of 832 days in filing the appeal deserved condonation and whether the appeal could be entertained beyond the statutory limitation period.

Analysis: The appeal was held to be governed by the limitation framework applicable to appeals from the Appellate Tribunal, and the Court applied the statutory limitation period as controlling. The explanation offered for the prolonged delay was found unsatisfactory, reflecting inaction and negligence rather than sufficient cause. The Court also noted that condonation cannot be granted as a matter of routine where the opposite party has accrued a vested right by lapse of limitation.

Conclusion: The delay was not condoned and the appeal was not maintainable beyond limitation.

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