Public servant coverage under anti-corruption law extends to a deemed university trustee, and grave suspicion defeats discharge.

The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was construed broadly to focus on public duty, and the term "University" in Section 2(c)(xi) was held to include a deemed university because the anti-corruption statute serves a different object from the University Grants Commission Act. On that basis, a trustee connected with a deemed university was not excluded from the definition of "public servant" where the record indicated involvement in institutional functions such as examinations. At the discharge stage under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court need only assess whether sufficient ground exists to proceed; as the material disclosed grave suspicion and a prima facie case regarding illegal gratification linked to examinations, discharge was held unwarranted and trial was permitted to proceed.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether a trustee connected with a deemed university falls within the expression "public servant" under Section 2(c)(xi) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; (ii) Whether the accused could be discharged under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the material then available.

Issue (i): Whether a trustee connected with a deemed university falls within the expression "public servant" under Section 2(c)(xi) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Analysis: The definition of "public servant" in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is wide and is centred on public duty rather than on formal nomenclature alone. The expression "University" in Section 2(c)(xi) was construed independently of the technical definition in the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, because the two enactments serve different objects and are not in pari materia. A deemed university performs the same educational public function as a university, and the legislative purpose of the anti-corruption law supports inclusion of persons connected with such institutions where they discharge functions relating to admissions, fees, and examinations. The evidence referred to in the record indicated prima facie involvement in the affairs of the institution connected with examinations.

Conclusion: The expression "University" in Section 2(c)(xi) includes a deemed university, and the respondent was not excluded from the scope of "public servant" on that ground.

Issue (ii): Whether the accused could be discharged under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the material then available.

Analysis: At the stage of discharge, the court is required only to determine whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not to undertake a detailed appreciation of evidence. Where the material discloses grave suspicion and a prima facie case, discharge is not warranted. On the allegations and statements noticed in the record, there was sufficient material indicating the respondent's alleged role in the demand and collection of illegal gratification linked to examinations, which called for trial rather than discharge.

Conclusion: Discharge under Section 227 was not justified on the facts before the court.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order of the High Court was set aside and the prosecution was permitted to proceed to trial.

Ratio Decidendi: For purposes of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, "University" in Section 2(c)(xi) is to be construed according to the anti-corruption statute's object and includes a deemed university, and where the record discloses grave suspicion, discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is impermissible.

---