Reassessment under amended tax law: limitation and prior approval tested under the substituted regime, with writ challenge failing.

In reassessment proceedings under the substituted sections 148 to 151, limitation must be computed under the amended regime together with the relaxation legislation and binding Supreme Court directions on exclusion of time. On that basis, the section 148A(b) notice, the section 148A(d) order and the consequential assessment were treated as within time. Approval under amended section 151 was also upheld because the sanction came from a statutory specified authority for a case beyond three years. The writ challenge therefore failed on both limitation and prior approval, and the reassessment action was sustained, leaving the assessee to pursue the statutory appellate remedy.

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Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment notice and the consequential order were barred by limitation under the amended reassessment regime read with the relaxation provisions and the directions in the cited Supreme Court decisions; (ii) Whether the reassessment notice was invalid for want of approval by the competent specified authority under the reassessment provisions.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment notice and the consequential order were barred by limitation under the amended reassessment regime read with the relaxation provisions and the directions in the cited Supreme Court decisions.

Analysis: The assessment year in question fell within the transition from the old reassessment regime to the substituted provisions. The earlier notice issued on 30.06.2021 was treated as a deemed notice under the new regime, the assessee was then issued a notice under section 148A(b), and the reply was received on 13.07.2022. The computation of limitation had to account for the substituted section 149, the exclusion of time contemplated by the relaxation legislation, and the exclusions flowing from the Supreme Court directions. On that basis, the notice under section 148A(b) was held to be within time, the order under section 148A(d) was passed before the expiry of the permissible period, and the consequential assessment order was also within limitation.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were not time-barred and the challenge on limitation failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the reassessment notice was invalid for want of approval by the competent specified authority under the reassessment provisions.

Analysis: Under the amended section 151, the specified authority depends on whether more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. For a case beyond three years, approval by the higher specified authority is sufficient if it falls within the statutory class of authorities named in the provision. The notice in the present case had the approval of the Director General of Income Tax (Investigation), who fell within the statutory category of specified authority applicable to the case. No jurisdictional defect was shown on this ground.

Conclusion: The challenge based on lack of proper approval failed.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was held to be without merit on both limitation and sanction, and the reassessment action was sustained; the petitioner was nevertheless left to pursue the statutory appellate remedy.

Ratio Decidendi: In a reassessment initiated after the substitution of sections 148 to 151, limitation and approval must be tested with the amended statutory scheme, the relaxation provisions, and any binding Supreme Court directions governing exclusion of time; where the notice and the section 148A(d) order are passed within the recomputed period and approval is granted by a statutory specified authority, writ interference is not warranted.

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