1998 (4) TMI 531 - SC - Indian Laws

SC: Only Bar Councils Can Suspend Advocates' Licences; Contempt Powers Under Arts.129,142 Cannot Debar Practice Everywhere

SC held that while exercising contempt jurisdiction under Arts. 129 and 142, it cannot suspend or revoke an advocate's licence (sanad) to practice, as ... Guilty of professional misconduct - Jurisdiction and powers of a Courts of Record in respect of criminal contempt - expression Court of Record - Award to the contemner a suspended sentence of imprisonment together with suspension of his practice as and advocate in the manner directed herein. - Whether the punishment for established contempt of Court committed by an Advocate can include punishment to debar the concerned advocate from practice by suspending his licence (sanad) for a specified period, in exercise of its powers under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India? Held that:- We are of the opinion that this court cannot in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 read with Article 129 of the Constitution, while punishing a contemner for committing contempt of court, also impose a punishment of suspending his licence to practice, where the contemner happens to be an Advocate. Such a punishment cannot even be imposed by taking recourse to the appellate powers under Section 38 of the Act while dealing with a case of contempt of court (and not an appeal relating to professional misconduct as such). To that extent, the law laid down in Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra, [1995 (3) TMI 467 - SUPREME COURT] is not good law and we overrule it. We do not entertain any doubt that the Bar Council of the State or Bar Council of India, as the case may be, when apprised of the established contumacious conduct of an advocate by the High Court or by this Court, would rise to the occasion, and take appropriate action against such an advocate. Under Article 144 of the Constitution 'all authorities civil and judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court'. The Bar Council which performs a public duty and is charged with the obligation to protect the dignity of the profession and maintain professional standards and etiquette is also obliged to act 'in aid of the Supreme Court'. It must, whenever, facts warrant rise to the occasion and discharge its duties uninfluenced by the position of the contemner advocate. It must act in accordance with the prescribed procedure, whenever its attention is drawn by this Court to the contumacious and unbecoming conduct of an advocate which has the tendency to interfere with due administration of justice. It is possible for the High Courts also to draw the attention of the Bar Council of the State to a case of professional misconduct of a contemner advocate to enable the State Bar Council to proceed in the manner prescribed by the Act and the rules framed thereunder. There is no justification to assume that the Bar Councils would not rise to the occasion, as they are equally responsible to uphold the dignity of the courts and the majesty of the and prevent any interference in the administration of justice. Nothing is more destructive of public confidence in the administration of justice than incivility, rudeness or disrespectful conduct on the part of a counsel towards the court or disregard by the court of the privileges of the bar. In case the Bar Council, even after receiving 'reference' from the court, fails to take action against the concerned advocate, this court might consider invoking its powers under Section 38 of the Act by sending for the record of the proceedings from the Bar Council and passing appropriate orders. Of Course the appellate powers under Section 38 would be available to this Court only and not to the High Courts. We, however hope that such a situation would not arise. In a given case it may be possible, for this Court or the High Court, the prevent the contemner advocate to appear before it till he purges himself of the contempt but that is much different from suspending or revoking his licence or debarring him to practice as an advocate. In a case of contemptuous, contumacious, unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of an Advocate-on-Record, this court possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court Rules itself, to withdraw his privilege to practice as an Advocate-an-Record because that privilege is conferred by this court and the power to grant the privilege includes the power to revoke or suspend it. The withdrawal of that privilege, however, does not amount to suspending or revoking his licence to practice as an advocate in other courts or Tribunals. It must be remembered that wider the amplitude of its power under Article 142, the greater is the need of care for this Court to see that the power is used with restraint without pushing back the limits of the constitution so as to function within the bounds of its own jurisdiction. To the extent, this Court makes the statutory authorities and other organs of the State perform their duties in accordance with law, its role is unexceptionable but it is not permissible or the Court to 'take over' the role of the statutory bodies or other organs of the State and 'perform' their functions. Upon the basis of what we have said above, we answer the question posed in the earlier part of this order, in the negative. The writ petition succeeds and is ordered accordingly. Issues Involved:1. Whether the Supreme Court can suspend an advocate's license to practice as a punishment for contempt of court.2. The extent of the Supreme Court's powers under Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution.3. The jurisdiction of the Bar Councils under the Advocates Act, 1961.Analysis:1. Whether the Supreme Court can suspend an advocate's license to practice as a punishment for contempt of court:The Supreme Court examined whether it could suspend an advocate's license as a form of punishment for contempt of court. The Court referenced the case of Vinay Chandra Mishra, where such a suspension was previously ordered. The Court concluded that suspending an advocate's license is not a recognized punishment under common law or statutory law for contempt of court. The power to suspend or revoke an advocate's license is vested exclusively in the Bar Councils as per the Advocates Act, 1961. The Court stated, 'Suspending the licence to practice of any professional like a lawyer, doctor, chartered accountant etc. when such a professional is found guilty of committing contempt of court, for any specified period, is not a recognized or accepted punishment which a court of record either under the common law or under the statutory law can impose, on a contemner, in addition to any of the other recognized punishments.'2. The extent of the Supreme Court's powers under Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution:The Court discussed its powers under Articles 129 and 142, noting that while these articles grant significant authority, they do not permit the Court to assume jurisdiction that is expressly vested in another statutory body. The Court emphasized, 'The plenary powers of this court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in the court and are complementary to those powers which are specifically conferred on the court by various statutes though are not limited by those statutes.' However, it clarified that these powers cannot be used to 'supplant' substantive law or to achieve indirectly what cannot be achieved directly. The Court concluded that it cannot suspend an advocate's license under Article 142 while dealing with a contempt case, as this would bypass the due process established under the Advocates Act.3. The jurisdiction of the Bar Councils under the Advocates Act, 1961:The Court reviewed the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961, which establish a detailed procedure for dealing with professional misconduct by advocates. The Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Bar Councils to suspend or revoke an advocate's license after a proper inquiry. The Court highlighted, 'After the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961, matters connected with the enrollment of advocates as also their punishment for professional misconduct is governed by the provisions of that Act only.' The Court stressed that it cannot take over the jurisdiction of the Bar Councils in matters of professional misconduct, which must be handled as per the procedure prescribed by the Act.Conclusion:The Supreme Court concluded that it does not have the authority to suspend an advocate's license to practice as a punishment for contempt of court under Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution. This power is vested exclusively in the Bar Councils under the Advocates Act, 1961. The Court overruled the decision in Vinay Chandra Mishra's case to the extent that it allowed the suspension of an advocate's license for contempt of court. The writ petition was allowed, affirming that the Bar Councils must handle cases of professional misconduct following the due process established by the Advocates Act.