Liberal construction of sufficient cause supports condonation of delay, with the State held to the same standard as other litigants.

The expression "sufficient cause" in limitation law must be construed liberally and pragmatically to advance substantial justice, so that meritorious matters are not rejected on technical delay. The same standard applies to the State as a litigant, and no stricter test is warranted merely because the applicant is the State. On the facts, the delay was sufficiently explained, so the delay was condoned and the time-bar dismissal was set aside.

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Issues: Whether delay in filing the appeal should be condoned on the ground of sufficient cause.

Analysis: The statutory power to condone delay is meant to advance substantial justice and the expression "sufficient cause" is to be construed liberally and pragmatically. A litigant ordinarily does not benefit by delay, and refusal to condone may defeat a meritorious matter on technical grounds. The same approach applies to the State as a litigant, and no special or stricter standard is warranted merely because the applicant is the State. On the facts, the delay was sufficiently explained.

Conclusion: Delay was condoned and the order dismissing the appeal as time-barred was set aside in favour of the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: The expression "sufficient cause" in the law of limitation must receive a liberal, justice-oriented construction so that matters are decided on merits rather than rejected on technical delay, and the State is entitled to the same standard of treatment as any other litigant.

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