Condonation of delay under Section 5 Limitation Act applying liberal common sense approach permits appeal despite 104-day delay

Clarifies the scope of "sufficient cause" and the exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, endorsing a liberal, pragmatic and common-sense inquiry rather than strict day-by-day scrutiny; where a bona fide compromise and supporting evidence explain inactivity, the explanation's acceptability governs condonation and refusal may defeat substantial justice. Operative effect: a 104-day delay was held excusable and the application for condonation was allowed, resulting in the impugned order being quashed and set aside in favour of the applicants.

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Issues: Whether the delay of 104 days in filing the appeal is excusable as "sufficient cause" and whether the court should exercise its discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay.

Analysis: The judgment examines the scope of "sufficient cause" and the judicial discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, emphasizing a liberal, pragmatic and common-sense approach rather than a pedantic day-by-day scrutiny. The facts show a compromise between the parties, supported by oral evidence and a written compromise (Exh. 30), which caused the petitioners to remain inactive and delayed in filing the appeal. The impugned order rejected condonation based largely on the period of delay and applied an unduly rigid standard. The decision applies settled principles that refusal to condone may defeat substantial justice, that length of delay is not decisive, and that the acceptability of the explanation is the governing criterion.

Conclusion: The delay of 104 days is condoned; the application for condonation of delay is allowed and the impugned order is quashed and set aside in favour of the petitioners.

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