Condonation of delay requires sufficient cause; prolonged unexplained delay by the State is not excused as of right.

Condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 requires a real and satisfactory explanation showing sufficient cause. A liberal approach may be considered for State litigants, but delay is not condoned as a matter of right and judicial discretion must be exercised on the facts pleaded. Here, the prolonged and unexplained lapse, including failure to act promptly after the earlier High Court dismissal, was treated as mere excuse and not a legally acceptable justification. The delay was therefore held not condonable, and the special leave petition was liable to be dismissed as time-barred.

---

---

Issues: Whether the delay in filing and re-filing the special leave petition could be condoned on the facts pleaded by the State.

Analysis: The application for condonation of delay disclosed no sufficient cause. The explanation was treated as a mere excuse rather than a legally acceptable justification. While a liberal approach to delay is sometimes adopted in matters involving the State, condonation remains discretionary and cannot be claimed as of right. The prolonged and unexplained lapse, including the failure to act with promptitude even after the earlier dismissal in the High Court, showed utter lethargy and indolence. The governing principle under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 requires a real and satisfactory explanation, and the Court found none.

Conclusion: The delay was not condonable and the special leave petition was liable to be dismissed as time-barred.

Ratio Decidendi: Condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is a matter of judicial discretion requiring sufficient cause, and governmental litigants are not exempt from showing a real, acceptable explanation for prolonged delay.

---