Liberal condonation of delay principles apply where sufficient cause is shown and counsel's bona fide mistake is not deliberate.

A liberal, justice-oriented approach applies to condonation of delay where the explanation shows no inaction, negligence or mala fides. The concept of "sufficient cause" is elastic and should advance substantial justice; a pedantic demand to explain every day's delay is impermissible, and a bona fide mistake of counsel should not ordinarily defeat the litigant. On the stated facts, the 226-day delay in filing the revision petition was satisfactorily explained and treated as non-deliberate, resulting in condonation of delay and restoration of the revision petition.

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Issues: Whether sufficient cause was shown to condone the delay of 226 days in filing the revision petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: The explanation for delay was assessed on a liberal and justice-oriented approach. The Court applied the settled principle that "sufficient cause" is elastic and should advance substantial justice where there is no inaction, negligence, or mala fides. It also noted that a pedantic insistence that every day's delay must be explained is impermissible, and that the litigant should not ordinarily suffer for a bona fide mistake of counsel. On the facts, the delay was found to be satisfactorily explained and not deliberate.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the revision petition was directed to be restored; the issue was decided in favour of the petitioner.

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