Condonation of delay requires sufficient cause; later Supreme Court admission of connected appeals cannot revive a time-barred departmental appeal.

Condonation of delay in filing a departmental appeal requires sufficient cause for the entire period of default. A later development, such as the Supreme Court admitting connected civil appeals after limitation had expired, cannot by itself revive a time-barred appeal or justify the delay. The delay here was not caused by administrative movement of the file, and the order under challenge had initially been accepted. As the department failed to show sufficient cause, the condonation request was rejected and the appeal was dismissed.

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Issues: Whether the departmental appeal could be admitted by condoning the delay on the ground that later admission of connected civil appeals by the Supreme Court showed that the issue was still open.

Analysis: The delay was not attributable to any slow or bureaucratic movement of the file. The order in appeal had initially been accepted, and the appeal was filed only after the department noticed that related matters had been admitted before the Supreme Court. The governing test remained whether sufficient cause existed for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed period. A circumstance arising after the period of limitation had expired could not, by itself, constitute sufficient cause. The cited precedents also supported the view that a later change or clarification in legal position does not justify revival of a time-barred appeal.

Conclusion: The department failed to show sufficient cause for the delay, so the condonation request was rejected and the appeal was dismissed.

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